Department of State Daily Press Briefing 3/26/24

All right. Good afternoon, everyone. No Matt Lee today? Who wants to go first?

I’ll go. Me.

Leon. A lot of people auditioning for the role of Matt Lee. Let the record reflect a snicker from the front row.

[inaudible 00:00:29].

I know you talked about this already yesterday, but I’d like to come back to it because it’s a little bit mind-boggling to me. Since when is a UN resolution, a Security Council UN resolution non-binding? Because that’s a significant shift. That’s not the understanding of most countries, and it’s not the understanding of the UN either.

(00:54)
This is not a Chapter VII resolution, so I don’t get how the US is now saying that it would be non-binding, and basically giving the message that another country wouldn’t necessarily need to comply with it?

So let me explain what we meant by that. First of all, as we said yesterday and we made clear all along, we have always believed that the path to a ceasefire and the release of hostages is something that will be reached through negotiations between Israel and Hamas, enabled by third-party countries, and in which the United States is participating, and not through a UN process, and that remains our belief.

(01:36)
Nevertheless, when we say the resolution is non-binding, what we mean is that it does not impose any new obligations on the parties, the way, for example, some UN resolutions that impose obligatory sanctions, impose actual requirements on people to implement them. That said, we do believe that even though this resolution lacks non-binding provisions and lacks new requirements that is imposed on the parties, it does carry weight, and it is something that should be implemented.

I mean, that’s a little bit contradictory, if I may. I mean, either it’s binding or it’s non-binding. If it’s non-binding, like you said, because it lacks provisions, why would anybody comply with it?

It’s non-binding in that it does not impose any new obligations on the parties. But we do believe it should be respected, that it carries weight, and that it should be implemented, as has always been our belief when it comes to UN Security Council resolutions.

[inaudible 00:02:32]?

Sure.

Okay. So if this was non-binding, now, the other resolution, the three resolutions that you vetoed, were they also in the same kind of resolution?

So Said, I’d have to go back and look at the provisions of those, but we vetoed them, so ultimately, they weren’t the voice of the UN Security Council.

So I’m saying if they are not binding, then why bother and veto it?

Because they carry weight and should be implemented, and so we want to see resolutions that pass ultimately reflect the policy positions of the United States, which is what I said yesterday.

(03:05)
We came to the determination that this Security Council resolution, although it did contain, or it lacked some provisions that we wanted to see, most notably condemning Hamas’ actions on October 7th, that ultimately it called for two things that we support: a ceasefire and the release of hostages together. And so that’s why we abstained from the resolution. We do believe that it carries weight and should be implemented.

But you know, and I remember during the whole Iraq thing, there were 12 UN resolutions, and they were all binding. They were all binding every time, and the US would be the first one to say it’s binding.

(03:41)
I mean, I worked in Iraq, I knew exactly what was going on. So I’m saying that any UN resolution that passes, that is allowed to pass, it potentially can be utilized within the framework of Chapter VII.

Is there a question there, Said?

Yes, there is. I’m asking you. Could you answer?

No, it’s just that was a statement. I want to see if there’s actually a question.

Absolutely. So, okay. Let me reframe my question. Do you think-

Or maybe ask one.

… that this resolution can potentially be subject to Chapter VII?

We believe that the UN Security Council resolution carries weight and should be respected, as I said.

Okay. I have a couple of other questions, but I’ll defer to others, on Gaza.

There are some reports that Israelis feel that their ability to depend on the United States has now decreased because of the abstention at the Security Council vote yesterday. Can you just speak to that and the relationship right now?

So absolutely not. First of all, the relationship between the United States and Israel is one that is longstanding, they’re a longstanding ally of the United States, and the President has made clear that the United States will always support Israel’s right to defend itself. That was true before our action in the Security Council yesterday. It remains true today.

(05:02)
As I said yesterday, the position that we take and the position that was contained in that resolution that led us to not block its moving forward is that there should be a ceasefire and there should be the release of hostages. That is our position. We have believed it has been Israel’s position, because Israel has been negotiating to try to achieve a ceasefire that would secure the release of hostages.

(05:25)
So far from there being, at least in our eyes, any distance between the United States and Israel, we believe the position that we were endorsing at the United Nations yesterday is the same one that Israel has been trying to achieve through the ongoing negotiations.

(05:38)
Now, none of that is to say there are not things with which we disagree with Israel. There obviously are. There have been a number of things in recent months where we’ve had disagreements with them, and we’ve been very direct and candid with them in our conversations about those disagreements, and those of course have been well-aired in public at this podium and in other places.

And Netanyahu’s office is indicating that the US not vetoing the resolution actually hampered or harmed the hostage talks. Is that the US understanding?

So that statement, which I believe said that Hamas pulled out of the hostage talks, or Hamas rejected the most recent proposal because of the United Nation Security Council resolution, that statement is inaccurate in almost every respect, and it is unfair to the hostages and their families.

(06:31)
The description of Hamas’ response that has been aired in the public is all from news reports. It’s not the actual substance of the response. And I can tell you that that response was prepared before the UN Security Council vote. Not after it.

(06:47)
So for the United States, we are not going to engage in rhetorical distractions on this issue. We are going to continue to work to try to bring the hostages home.

Just one last question on this. I understand that US officials say that there are domestic political concerns for Prime Minister Netanyahu when he went forward with canceling these Rafah meetings here in the United States.

(07:11)
But it does have a damaging effect on the US-Israel relationship as well, and now he’s going even further and saying that this move is harming hostage talks. Are there going to be ramifications for Israel for pulling back on these talks and for now blaming the US for hostage talks not moving forward quickly enough?

I wouldn’t look at the question of ramifications in the way that you pose the question. We’re not going to make our decisions based on minor disagreements or whether someone canceled a meeting or not. We’re going to make our decisions based on what we believe is in the best national security interest of the United States. And ultimately, when we have conversations with Israel, we are talking to them about what we believe are in the national security interests of Israel, as well as in the national security interests of the region, and in the interest of the Palestinian people and others.

(08:01)
So when you think about ramifications, we wanted to have that meeting with Israel, to present that to them, an alternative way to accomplish their legitimate security goals of defeating the Hamas battalions in Rafah, because we believe it is in their interest to do this in a better way. We believe that a full-scale military operation in Rafah will not just cause civilian harm to the Palestinian people, it will not just hinder the flow of humanitarian assistance, most of which is coming in through the Rafah area and being distributed initially through Rafah.

(08:37)
We believe that that kind of operation would hurt Israel’s national security. It will leave Israel more isolated in the world. It will separate Israel from countries that have been longtime partners of Israel. And you’ve heard this from countries all around the world.

(08:53)
So we have been making clear that this kind of operation is not in Israel’s interest, let alone in the interest of the Palestinian people. So when you speak to ramifications, those are the type of ramifications that we’re worried about for Israel, and that’s why we wanted to have this meeting to present to them what we think is a better alternative.

Are you rescheduling those meetings anytime soon?

I don’t have any announcements to make regarding schedules. Go ahead.

Just to clarify, what does it mean to say that the resolution should be implemented? From the Israeli point of view, I guess they would say there’s no deal to be taken at the moment, so how can they implement?

It goes back to the first point I made, which is that we believe a ceasefire and the release of hostages will be ultimately secured through negotiations, and it’s the negotiations that we have been pursuing in the region, most recently over the weekend, in Doha. And so we are going to continue to pursue those negotiations to reach a ceasefire and secure the release of all hostages.

Sure. I wonder if you can just talk about the meeting with the defense minister yesterday, the Israeli defense minister. Did he come with specific requests in terms of more arms that Israel wants the US to provide for the continued operation in Gaza?

So I’m not going to speak specifically to that, other than to say that as you would expect, whenever we have a conversation with the defense minister, they usually have things that they want from the United States. And I know that he’s having meetings at the Pentagon today. He also met at the White House yesterday.

(10:28)
From our perspective, and I will let the defense minister speak for himself, from our perspective, we were there to continue the conversation that the secretary had in Tel Aviv last week with the security cabinet, which included Defense Minister Gallant, about what we thought would be the harm of a full-scale military operation in Rafah, as well as more things we think Israel needs to do to allow humanitarian assistance in.

So you’ve got an ally coming, asking for more military support. You’ve already given quite a lot of military support during this operation, during this conflict, but they’re also basically planning to go ahead with an operation that you’re telling them is unwise. Are you saying your acceptance of these requests for future arms provisions is going to be conditioned in some way on whether you listen to us on Rafah or not?

Let’s take this one step at a time. We believe it’s still important to have this conversation. We believe that there is a better way for them to accomplish a legitimate security imperative, and I don’t want to preview any possible actions if it goes a different way.

Okay. On this-

Go ahead, Michel.

… did you provide the Israeli defense minister any guarantees that the US will continue providing Israel with arms?

So the President has spoken to this, he spoke to it recently and said that the United States will always support Israel’s right to defend itself. That’s not going to change, and I wouldn’t want to preview any further steps. Leon, go ahead. Go ahead.

Wondering, on Rafah, I mean, you’ve been very clear from the very beginning that you don’t dictate policy or operations to Israel. You’ve said that numerous times. You said you’re not involved in the military planning.

(12:12)
Here, you’re telling them not to do a major offensive in Rafah, but you’re giving them or want to talk to them about alternatives, whatever they may be, counter-terrorism, what have you. I don’t know specifically.

(12:26)
But by doing that, you would get directly involved in the operations that were to take place in Rafah, and potentially, there could be more civilian deaths and what have you. So in that case, you would be directly involved. How big of a problem is that?

So I don’t agree with that. Let me say a few things. Number one, when it comes to dictating, you’re right. No, we do not dictate to them. We can’t dictate to them. They’re a sovereign country, and the United States can’t dictate to any sovereign country. They’re going to make their own decisions. And they have been quite clear about that, and we

… we would expect nothing less from any sovereign country.

(13:02)
That said, we always offer our best advice to them. We have done that from the beginning. You’ve heard the President talk about that when he went to Israel just a week after or a little over a week after October 7th, where he talked about the fact that because Israel is such a longtime friend, we are going to offer advice about them, oftentimes colored by the mistakes that we have made and the experiences that we have learned from mistakes that we have made in our past and we have conducted military operations. And so we try-

Well, it wasn’t very good advice. Sorry to interrupt, but-

No, we try to give them that advice. In terms of the options that we will present to them, or that I assume we will present to them at some point, I wouldn’t think of it as military planning. We’re going to offer them, and I also don’t want to preview too much in detail publicly, because these are still conversations that ought to happen privately. But the intent would be to give them advice about how to conduct such operations. It’s not to do actual military planning. For example, what to do when, how, with that level of specificity. When I talk about we’re not involved in military planning, that’s what I mean. We’re not in with them, planning exact military operations. But we have always offered them advice about what we believe the best way to go about this operation is. That’s true going back to some of the first meetings that we had in Israel right after October 7th.

Well, then either one of two things, either you gave very bad advice, because you have 30,000 civilians who got killed, or they didn’t listen to your advice. So what about Rafah? You think they would? Are they actually listening to what you’re saying? Because they said if we don’t have the U.S. on board, we’re going it alone.

So they will speak for themselves, but we have not yet had the meeting where we outline the steps that we believe that they ought to take.

Thank you. I appreciate it. A couple more questions. First of all, the Palestinian Red Cross just announced that an Al Amal Hospital in Khan Younis has been completely shut down. The Israeli army threw out the patients, the staff, and so on, and put dirt, whatever, they closed it off and so on. Are you aware of this?

So I haven’t seen that exact report. I’ve seen reports of operations at hospitals. Hold on, hold on, Said. Just let me finish. I’ve seen reports of operations at hospitals; I haven’t seen that specific one. And I know that oftentimes we’ve gotten, especially over the past few days, conflicting information from Palestinian sources and Israeli sources about exactly what is going to happen. So I’m a little reluctant to make a definitive comment absent definitive information.

(15:35)
What I will say, two things. Number one, we generally don’t want to see operations at hospitals. But number two, you have seen over the past few weeks that areas that had been cleared by Israel, that Hamas fighters have flowed back in and are inside hospitals. And so while we don’t want to see operations in hospitals, we also don’t believe that Hamas should be hiding there. And we would, again, encourage them to stop hiding behind patients and hospitals.

Will you look into Al Amal Hospital situation?

Of course.

Okay. A couple more things. Now, UNRWA, I know that the largest contributor thus far has been the United States of America, so that’s a big chunk, close to $350 million a year, maybe $400 million a year, except, I mean, these operations not only in Gaza, but they are in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon and in Jordan and in Syria. How do you see this being replaced? Because obviously nobody’s going to shell out that kind of funding. And while the World Food Program and so on can provide food, they cannot replace UNRWA in terms of providing medical care, schools, all kinds of stuff that they do, that they have uniquely done thus far.

So Said, I think you’re referring to, you didn’t mention it definitively, but just to make sure I’m clear, you’re referring to the provision that the United States Congress passed to ban U.S. funding of UNRWA. So-

Right. Because I have a follow-up on that.

Right. So you’re right, that Congress has barred us in this fiscal year and a few months beyond from continuing to fund UNRWA. We do remain committed to the work that UNRWA does. It’s important. We also remain committed to providing humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.

(17:22)
I will note that in that appropriations bill that passed that contained that provision there is somewhere north of $10 billion for humanitarian assistance around the world. That is the pot of money from which we would have drawn to fund UNRWA. And I can tell you that we will draw from that pot of money to fund humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, and we’re exploring what avenues that assistance will take now.

Okay. And my question, to follow up on this one, the President of the United States has, for instance, when they passed the resolution back in ’95 that the embassy should be moved to Jerusalem, we had an executive waiver that the presidents used time, every six months and so on to keep the embassy in Tel Aviv. Will the President have a similar waiver to keep funding of UNRWA going if it-

I think that’s a question you should direct to the White House.

Okay. Thank you.

Any more on Israel before I go on? Yeah, Ryan, go ahead.

Just on your point about Israel being a sovereign country and the U.S. can’t tell them what to do, back on May 19th, 2021, you have Joe Biden telling Netanyahu, his quote was, “Hey man, we’re out of runway here. It’s over.” And it was over. Ronald Reagan famously did the same back in 1982, told them it was over. Why can’t he say “it’s over” this time? Does that mean that he supports the continuation of this war, even if it means going into Rafah?

So we support Israel’s ability to defeat Hamas. We support Israel’s legitimate security objectives. We support them ensuring that October 7th can never happen again, and so we continue to support their ability to do that while offering, as I said, our best advice on how to go about that campaign, and that’s what we’ll continue to do.

What is your assessment on those two Hamas battalions that the U.S. has said are so key to take out and that Israel has said are key to take out? What’s the assessment on why Hamas wouldn’t be able to just create new battalions in the absence of a political solution?

Yeah. Yeah. Actually it’s a great question. First of all, I think it’s more than two. I think it’s more than two battalions that Israel has said continue to operate in Rafah.

(19:27)
A few things about that. First, in the areas in which it has operated, Israel has been somewhat successful in taking out the leadership of some of those Hamas battalions, and while you can replace fighters, ultimately the leaders are harder to replace, or at least takes more time. The initial people who might move up into a leadership role maybe don’t have the same experience that those who have been training for some time do, so Israel has been successful in taking out some of the leadership of the Hamas battalions and in taking out fighters, either by killing them on the battlefield or arresting them. So it has degraded Hamas’ battalions outside of Rafah, and we believe in a military operation, hopefully in the way that we are suggesting, they could be successful in degrading those battalions in Rafah as well, and that’s something that we would support.

(20:14)
That said, your underlying question is exactly right. Ultimately, something that we have learned in our counterterrorism experience around the world is that while you can accomplish counterterrorism objectives on the battlefield, ultimately, when it comes to winning the larger battle, you have to offer a political path for the Palestinian people’s legitimate, or in this case, we believe you have to offer a political path for the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations. And so you have heard the Secretary make very clear that there needs to be a political path forward for a couple reasons: one, because you have to offer that legitimate path to people; but two, because in order to have some other kind of security force in place to keep those Hamas battalions from reforming, you have to have a political solution. You have to have a political path forward.

(21:11)
So, for example, one of the possibilities is for the Palestinian Authority to offer policing and security on the ground with a trained-up force. Well, you have to have the PA operating in Gaza to be able to do that. And so you have to have a political path forward to achieve that. So we have made very clear that Israel’s ultimate long-term security objectives can only be accomplished not just through a military campaign but through some kind of political resolution with the Palestinian people.

Can the U.S. imagine Hamas or some version of it being a part of that political solution if that’s what the Palestinian-

No, no. Absolutely not. Hamas is a brutal terrorist organization that committed terrorist acts long before October 7th and then, of course, committed the heinous attacks on October 7th, so they do not have any right to political participation, given the blood that continues to be on their hands.

On Gaza.

I have a Pakistan question-

I’ll come back to you. Yeah, finish Gaza.

Gaza.

Yeah. Go ahead.

Thank you. I have a simple question. U.S. allowed Gaza ceasefire. What does that mean for the war?

I’m sorry, what?

That U.S. allowed a Gaza ceasefire. What does that mean for the war?

I don’t know what you mean. I don’t know what you mean, the U.S. I don’t know what you mean, the U.S. allowed a Gaza ceasefire.

That ceasefire in the UN resolution, you support it.

In the resolution? I spoke to that. I spoke to that already.

And can I have another question on Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu?

Let me come back to you. I just want to close out Israel.

Yeah, thank you.

Rowdy room today. Go ahead.

I want to go to the military aid. You’ve seen the reports that people drowned while trying to get to those aid, and previously the aid fell on the head of other people. There is still some difficulty in bringing convoys to the northern Gaza. Israelis still put a lot of restrictions on that. What your plan to ease this and prevent future incidents like that?

So I have seen the reports of people unfortunately drowning, and it is a tragedy. And it’s not just a tragedy that those, I believe it’s 12 individuals died trying to get aid. It’s a tragedy that they felt so desperate that they had to swim out in the ocean to try to retrieve it in the first place. No one should have to do that. No one should have to put themselves at risk to try to get food and water and medicine for their families. It should just be there for them, and that is what we are trying to accomplish through the work that we are doing to provide humanitarian assistance and in our engagements with the Government of Israel to encourage them to facilitate the delivery of additional humanitarian assistance.

(23:50)
So, excuse me, air drops have always been a supplement to the humanitarian assistance that goes in through the land, not a replacement. The same is true for the maritime option that we have been working to deploy, this floating pier that we want to deploy to get aid in, not over land but over sea into Gaza, which would dramatically increase the amount of humanitarian assistance flowing it and would not carry the same risks that air drops unfortunately do.

(24:20)
But that said, even that is not a replacement to aid going in over land. We believe aid going in over land needs to be increased and it needs to be sustained. We have seen some improvement over the past few weeks, but there have been times before where we have seen an increase in the number of trucks going in on a daily basis, and that increase hasn’t been sustained. It’s fallen off for a variety of reasons, and so we want to see the modest increase that we’ve gotten be sustained, be increased, and then be sustained at an increased level. And that’s what we’re working on every day to try to achieve.

But those tragedies, Matt, are manmade. They’re not because of the nature of the geography of the region or whatever. They are because of the Israeli restrictions on letting aid to get in. This can easily be dealt with.

So this is not a simple, one-faceted problem. There was a lot of aid going into Gaza before October 7th, before Hamas launched this war that has had such a dramatic impact on the Palestinian people. So anyone that says Hamas doesn’t also bear some responsibility in the tragic situation and in the inability of aid to get into Israel is ignoring the reality on the ground and ignoring the fact that it was Hamas that launched this war in the first place, and it is Hamas that has at times prevented aid from actually getting to the people it needed to inside Gaza.

(25:41)
So we believe Israel needs to do more to facilitate the increase of humanitarian assistance into Gaza. We have been quite clear about that, and you have seen the Secretary push the Israeli Government. You’ve seen the President push the Israeli Government. It is because of our interventions that Rafah opened in the first place; it is because of our interventions that Kerem Shalom opened. It is

Because of our interventions that the 96 gate opened in the last few weeks, and got us up to the level that we are at now. But that doesn’t mean we’re satisfied. We want to see that level continue to increase and that’s why we continue to stay engaged.

Last syllable. Last one. Last one.

On the question about the address.

I have a last question.

Okay. We’ll come back.

Just if any update on when the pier will be operational?

I would defer to the Pentagon on that who has operational control over that issue.

Thank you.

Sorry, on the airdrops, are you saying, you said it’s tragic, but do you know if these were US airdrops?

I don’t. I would refer to the Pentagon on that question.

Were there airdrops going… You don’t know if an airdrop was going on yesterday?

The Pentagon has been conducting regular airdrops, but other countries have also been conducting regular airdrops. So I’d refer to the Pentagon to speak to that specific one that the question referenced. Hold on, guys. Guys, no one needs to talk. Anyone else have anything on Gaza before we move on? Yeah, go ahead.

How the USA look at the people or a human being that Israel arrested them, around 7,000 more have been arrested from Israel or by Israel in West Bank and in Gaza some of them like humiliated. Does USA look at them as hostage or are they legally present? Because Hamas now in the part of the negotiation is to exchange hostages, to release some hostages from Israeli presence and releasing some hostage with Hamas. How USA look at those southern people that USA arrested them and humiliated them?

We believe that every detainee, whether it’s in Israel or anywhere around the world, should be treated with dignity and should be treated with respect for the law.

But the hostage-

I’m just going to move on because we spent a lot of time and I want to get to the other stuff. Go ahead on Gaza and then we’ll move on to other things.

The United States emphasized that release the hostages in Gaza is a priority. Why some of them were called due to the Israeli bombing in different parts. There is no safety piece, middle, north, south, and some were due to the hunger and stress and thirst. Despite this, the United States still emphasized that the hostages issue is priority. Don’t you see US appears a large part of this responsibility because it’s continued to supply IDF with the military aid?

The only entity that bears responsibility for the plight of the hostages and the fact that they continue to be held is Hamas. It’s Hamas that took these hostages, it’s Hamas that has refused to release these hostages, it’s a Hamas that could release them today if it wanted to. So no, I think there’s only one entity that bears responsibility. It’s Hamas. Go ahead. This would be the last question on the Israel. Well, then we’ll move on, maybe.

Yeah. Question on Israel and then I have two on… I’m kind of in a hurry if you don’t mind, Matthew. Thank you.

You’re kind of in a hurry?

Yeah. No, very busy as you can see. Okay.

Okay.

It’s a busy news day. Busy news day. So there is funding for UNRA that was suspended. Given that the minibus prohibits funding of unearth through 2025, what will happen to the suspended funding? Is it still available where the US to find the investigation into UNRA employees allegedly involved in October 7th satisfactory, or does it get to go back to the Treasury Department?

It’s funding that we can use for other humanitarian assistance priorities.

Okay. And then, regarding what happened in Baltimore, the bridge collapse. It was a ship that had a Singaporean flag and then it was supposed to go to Sri Lanka. Has the United States been in touch with Sri Lanka in Singapore for the incident?

I’m not aware of any contacts with Sri Lanka. The US Embassy Singapore has been in contact with Singapore’s Maritime Port Authority, which has offered to provide assistance to the US Coast Guard.

And does the US expect this tragedy to interrupt international commerce?

I’m not going to speak to it from here. I would defer to other agencies. Obviously, the Port of Baltimore has been closed. You heard the President speak to the fact that they want to get it reopened as soon as possible, but I would refer to an agency with more direct responsibility to comment, and to offer any kind of actual assessment of the effect on shipping.

Thank you so much.

Alex. Go ahead.

Thank you, Matt. A few separate topics. Let me start with Evan Gershkovich. Today, Russian court extended his detention beyond one year until June, which one might argue that contradict against even their own laws. Prosecutors are allowed to expand on the complex cases beyond one year and they have claimed that this was not a complex case. He was, as I said at the very beginning, captured red-handed. What was your reaction and have you received any evidence from Russia during this one year?

So let me just say that at the hearing today, Russian authorities did not provide any evidence of a crime. They just extended his detention for another three months, and despite their claims, they have provided no justification for holding him at all. And we believe there’s a simple reason for doing that. It’s because he has done nothing wrong. It’s because journalism is not a crime. So we believe as we have believed, that Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich or Paul Whelan who has been detained for five years, as bargaining chips. They should be released immediately.

There’s a point that you just made about bargaining chips. Have you exhausted your options in terms of defending him, getting him out of Russian jail?

I’m not going to speak to that in detail, but other than to say that no, we continue to remain engaged on trying to secure the release of both Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, and that will remain a top priority for us.

On that context, I was also hoping you could help us put [inaudible 00:31:54] case into context. I asked this week to Vedant, but if she’s not wrongfully detained, then what is this all about in your opinion?

So I’m not going to speak to that other than what Vedant said last week and what you have heard us say many times about the case. I don’t have any new assessment to offer today.

Another question in regard [inaudible 00:32:11] Moscow attack.

Come on.

Just going back to yesterday. The Secretary also spoke to ISIS right, this morning. Despite the fact the terrorist group has claimed responsibility, Russian officials most recently the spy chief today, keep claiming that not only Ukraine, the US, the UK, everyone’s behind it. So how do you read that?

So, first of all, it’s simply not true. We’ve made that clear that there is no evidence at all that Ukraine was involved in this because Ukraine was not involved in this. And I would say that those comments by Russian officials, including from President Putin, are just propaganda to justify their continued aggression against Ukraine. Go ahead.

Thank you very much, Matt. Last week, Assistant Secretary Donald Lu had stated that the US is not in the favor of Pakistan starting work on the pipeline with Iran. Now Pakistan is consulting some law firms to see if the US can give a waiver. Is there a chance for a waiver or no?

So I’m not going to preview any potential sanction actions, as I never do from here, or any actions involving sanctions. But we always advise everyone that doing business with Iran runs the risk of touching upon and coming in contact with our sanctions and would advise everyone to consider that very carefully. And as the Assistant Secretary made clear last week, we do not support this pipeline going forward.

Just one more thing. Today, five Chinese who were working in Pakistan were hit by a suicide car bomb. Five of them have perished. Do you also have the same feeling with regard to Pakistan doing business with China as well, especially with regard to the CPAC, or no?

So I would say that, first of all, we condemn the attack on a convoy of PRC engineers in Pakistan. We are deeply saddened by the loss of life and injuries sustained and share our heartfelt condolences with those affected by the attack. The Pakistani people have suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists. And I’ll note that PRC nationals in Pakistan have also been the victims of terrorist attacks and no country should suffer the acts of terror. And I don’t have anything beyond that. Ryan?

Don Lu last week had said that he wants to see the Pakistani courts undertake an investigation into election rigging and irregularities. Today, as you may have seen, there was this extraordinary statement from six Supreme Court Justices in Pakistan saying that they have been pressured, tortured, their families abducted and pressured by the Pakistani military to put pressure on the court system. What is the US response to these judges coming forward rather courageously to make these claims? And does that undermine the confidence in the court’s ability to independently assess the election?

So let me just say with that, I saw the letter right before I came out here. I didn’t have a chance to read it or to consult with any of my colleagues about it. So before I offer any definitive comment, let me take that back and consult with people and get something for you. Kylie, did you have something? No?

On Ukraine.

Ukraine? Yeah, go ahead.

The Ukrainians have recently said after some reports about the US warning them not to target Russian oil refineries, that they understand those warnings, but they have certain military targets that they will continue to target. Can you just bring us up to speed with regard to those conversations between the US and Ukraine, and if you guys have recently been telling them that they should not go after these Russian oil refineries?

So I’m not going to speak to specific conversations, but it has always been our position since the outset of this war that we do not encourage or support Ukraine taking strikes outside its own territory.

Okay. But there have been reports of this happening more recently. So have these conversations been re-upped even though they’ve been reiterated?

I’m not going to speak to specific conversations, but this has been our long time policy that we have made clear to the Ukrainian government. So it’s not something of which they would be unaware.

Okay.

Go ahead.

It has been announced that meeting between the Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, Secretary Blinken, and President of the European Commission to be held on April 5. So what items are on the agenda, is any support for Armenia is being considered? Is it of a political, economic, or security nature?

So I’m not going to speak in detail other than to say that our objectives in every engagement with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan are to encourage them to work to bridge the differences between the two countries and reach a durable and lasting peace agreement. Michelle, and then Simon, then we’ll close out.

Rule today that Julian Assange would not be extradited immediately and gave the US three weeks to give a series of assurances around his First Amendment rights and that he would not receive the death penalty. Do you have any comment on that?

Yeah, my comment is that you should take that question to the Justice Department who can speak to it. We don’t typically comment on extradition matters. I was a little flipped, that wasn’t a comment after all. It’s a referral to DOJ. They should speak to that. Simon, let me hold you off. I’m going to take a couple over here then I’ll come to you to close that. Go ahead.

About today’s meeting between Secretary Lincoln and Iraqi Foreign Minister, have they touched the disputes between Erbil and Baghdad in that meeting and what does the US view on the dispute between these two cities? Do you have any concern about that?

So they did discuss that issue. The Secretary made clear that stability between Baghdad and Erbil would bring economic benefits to all Iraqis. It would be good for the region and that we encourage the two partners to work together.

And second question about the energy issue, which Secretary Blinken mentioned that they will discuss this in their meeting. It’s been a year that the KRG oil export been stopped and the IOC, including the US companies, has stopped their operations, and there’s a dispute between the US companies and Iraqi Ministry of Oil. So the US has been engaged with all parties to resume that [inaudible 00:38:33]. In your point of view, why it hasn’t happened yet and then how does the US work with the US companies and also the Iraqi government to resume that export?

The US has been engaged at the most senior levels on this issue and we have urged all parties to reach an agreement to resume the flow of oil through this pipeline. We believe that restarting oil exports through the pipeline would be mutually beneficial to all parties and because of that reason, that’s why we’ll continue to pursue it.

Thank you, Matt.

Go ahead.

The Taliban claimed recently that they have crashed ISIS cave in Afghanistan. However, we have seen that the ISIS branch has expanded its operation, particularly with the recent attacks in Iran, Moscow, also in Kandahar. How do you see ISIS-KP activities and operation in Afghanistan and also in the region? Also, Lindsey Graham yesterday said in a tweet, “We should be hitting ISIS-K targets in Afghanistan hard, disrupting their operation before it’s too late.” What is your reaction?

So we have long been worried about ISIS-K’s potential for terrorist activities. You’ve seen us actually give warnings to Russia and Iran about these two most recent terrorist attacks and you’ve seen ISIS-K plots disrupted in Europe. And so we have made clear that we need to remain vigilant against the threat of ISIS-K and we’re working with our allies and partners to do just that. And then I would say with respect to Afghanistan, we have always said that it is important that Afghanistan not become a safe haven for terrorists who might want to bring harm to Americans. We have demonstrated a commitment to hold terrorists in Afghanistan accountable, but we have also made clear to the Taliban that it is in their interest to counter violent terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. Simon, now we’ll close that out.

Yeah, [inaudible 00:40:20] given a briefing, a statement from Senator Van Holland regarding your comments yesterday about the National Security Memorandum 20. So he’s seeking some clarity on basically what you said about this yesterday. Have you determined and what is the basis for determining that those assurances provided by Israel in line with the NSM-20 are credible and reliable?

I do think there’s been a lot of confusion around this memo really from the beginning. Let me back up and say that the memo required all of the seven relevant countries, as well as other countries that are not in active conflict that will report later, but these seven relevant countries, including Israel, to make assurances to the United States that they will not act in violation of international humanitarian law. But it has always been required that these countries that are receiving defense articles from the United States Act in compliance with international humanitarian law, both in the use of those defense articles and in the provision of humanitarian assistance and in allowing humanitarian assistance to enter into the affected areas. That is not a requirement that was imposed by the NSM. It is something that was already required by US law. And so we have already before the NSM had processes ongoing to assess Israel’s compliance with international humanitarian law, both, as I said yesterday, in the use of those arms and as it pertains to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

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And we have yet reached any conclusion that they’re in violation of international humanitarian loss. So when we receive those assurances from the government of Israel and the governments of Ukraine and other governments, we look at those assurances and we look at them informed by the assessments that we have had ongoing. And as I said, the assessment, we have not reached the conclusion with respect to Israel that they have violated international humanitarian law. But those are processes that are very much ongoing. They didn’t start with the letter, as I said they were going on before and they’ll continue. And the next step is we are due to provide Congress a report. That’s the next thing that’s required by this memo on May 8th, where we’ll get into these issues in more detail.

To try to clarify that-

Simon has the last question, we already said.

… make sense of that a little bit. So you haven’t reached the conclusion that Israel have violated international humanitarian law, but have you reached the conclusion that they haven’t? Has any process concluded that found that they haven’t breached international humanitarian law?

The processes are ongoing. That’s when I say that these processes to assess their compliance with their international humanitarian law are ongoing, they have not reached a definitive conclusion. Now, the way this usually works is we have partners that we provide defense articles to. They use those defense articles. You see allegations at times that those defense articles are used in violation of international humanitarian law and we assess them, and those assessments are ongoing and those assessments could reach a conclusion at some point that there were violations of international law or that they’re in compliance with international law. But those ongoing processes remain ongoing and not terminated at this point.

Given this war has been going on for nearly six months, can we assume that there have been some incidents that have been fully assessed, that have taken place during this war that people might’ve seen? There’s a few that have come up in this meeting and there’s been incidents that you’ve then raised with the Israelis. Have there been incidents that have gone through whatever black box process this involves come out of the end with a green tick with the US saying, “We’re fine with this?”

So it’s hard to answer that question without getting too much into internal deliberations. I will say that the way these processes work, as you would expect when you look at any kind of thing, they have different levels that they move through. There are a number of incidents that have been raised as potential violations of international humanitarian law that we are able to look at with a very quick assessment and determine that no, there’s an actual justification for this action and it does not violate international humanitarian law. We look at a particular strike, for example. There are others that are more complicated that require an extensive fact-finding process and taking those facts and applying them against the law, and a number of those are ongoing.

Can you say whether by May 8th, when you provide this report to Congress, will you be able to say conclusively?

I just can’t speak to where we might be on May 8th at this point, so it’s a month and a half away.

Can you clarify one thing on that? When you’re saying we have not yet reached the conclusion, you’re talking about the whole since the beginning of the war. Because it could be almost interpreted as we have not seen yet up until now certain acts in violation of US law basically. You see what I mean?

I don’t, I don’t. Maybe other people do. I’m just slow, but I don’t see what you meant.

You say we have not yet reached the conclusion that-

Correct, yeah.

You could interpret that by saying we have not yet made the determination from October 7th up until today that they have done something against international law. That’s not what you’re saying. You’re saying the whole assessment, you haven’t yet made a conclusion on the whole assessment, right?

Again, I’m not sure. We have not concluded in any sense. And again, when you come to the use of weapons, it’s a determination you have to make with respect to individual strikes or individual campaigns or individual acts. And so we have had ongoing assessments to look at some of those. In none of those have we yet found violations of international humanitarian law. I don’t know if that answers your question. I’m not sure.

And you have not found any violations?

That’s correct. Yeah, that’s correct. That’s what I meant to say. But a number of them are ongoing.

So you have reached a conclusion on some specific events up until now where there has been no violation.

Yeah, but that’s not to say that all those have gone through an entire process because some of them… This is what I was trying to say in answer to Simon’s question. There are different levels of review and you can imagine a filtering process if you look at something and some you can throw out right away, an allegation that’s not substantiated. Some that require more. And so we have had those. And then there are others that require more fact-finding and more review, and those are ongoing.

Isn’t the whole point of the NSM and I think what Senator Van Holland, to come back to that, what he’s trying to do by getting you to agree to this is to put some kind of deadlines and reporting requirements on it? But what you’re describing is kind of a process that never has to come to any firm conclusions about anything.

No, I wouldn’t agree with that. If you look at the actual language of the NSM, it does require a report on May 8th, and that language does spell out things that we need to assess and things that we need to include in that report when it comes to credible allegations and how we are handling those. And I just can’t offer any more definitive guidance today about what that report is going to look like. Because again, remember, this is a brand new process. We’ve never done one of these reports before. This memo has only been around for 47 days now, so that we have an active process to figure out what that’s going to look like. But I can tell you that we will follow the obligations of the memo and send that to report to Congress by May 8th. So with that, we’ll end today. Thank you, everyone.