Mr. Adedeji Ebo (00:00):
... six declared chemical weapons related sites. Information made available to the OPCW suggests that there are more than a hundred other sites that may have been involved in the previous government chemical weapons related activities. As part of its work on this matter, the OPCW Technical Secretariat plans to visit all these locations, taking into account security and other relevant considerations. The new government of Syria has been working with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the program developed by the previous government and to ensure serious long-term compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
(01:04)
Given the significant challenges to overcome in these efforts, I welcome the continued progress that has been made since the council's last meeting. Madam President, since March 2025, more than 20 locations have been visited. The OPCW has also conducted interviews with former chemical weapons experts, collected 19 samples and over 6,000 documents from the visited locations. The Syrian government handed over 34 sealed cardboard boxes containing documents to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which have been documented and scanned and will be processed for translation and analysis.
(02:05)
During the reporting period, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has also continued consultations with the Syrian authorities on the implementation of expedited onsite destruction in exceptional cases as provided for in decision EC110/DEC.1. Madam President, based on the information gathered through the OPCW's deployment in 2025, at least two locations visited by the OPCW could be declarable under the CWC. The OPCW is planning further activities to determine the full scope of chemical weapons related activities conducted at these two facilities and their subsequent declarability.
(03:07)
Unfortunately, I understand from counterparts at the OPCW Technical Secretariat that further visits are currently on hold, given the conflict in the region. However, the OPCW teams continue to conduct interviews and review documents until the security situation becomes more permissive. Madam President, as noted in the report, from 27th to 29th January 2026, the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority visited a location in the Aleppo area to assess potentially undeclared elements of the chemical weapons program developed by the previous government, including "storage containers for chemical precursors and 75 undeclared cylinders."
(04:17)
Upon arrival at the location, the OPCW Technical Secretariat observed over a dozen large volume containers from which the OPCW team collected eight samples for further analysis. The cylinders were no longer present at the site, but on 28th January, the Syrian National Authority identified that they had been removed and reportedly destroyed at a local scrap yard. On 29th January, the OPCW team visited the scrap yard and observed pieces that may have been part of the gas cylinders.
(05:05)
Madam President, the significant challenges ahead have been repeatedly emphasized in this council and the details shared about this visit further underlined some of these challenges. I welcome the continued cooperation by the Syrian National Authority with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which is essential to these efforts. However, significant and consistent support from the international community is also needed to complete the extraordinary efforts to rid Syria of all chemical weapons.
(05:52)
I also take this opportunity to reiterate United Nations support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity, and independence of the work of the OPCW. Madam President, distinguished members of Security Council, as I have previously emphasized, this is a critical opportunity for the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. I once again urge the members of this council to unite and show leadership in providing the support that this unprecedented effort will require. The United Nations stands ready to support and will continue to do our part to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons anywhere and at any time. I thank you very much for your attention.
Speaker 1 (06:57):
I thank Mr. Ebo for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Andrew Moore.
Mr. Andrew Moore (07:05):
Madam President, excellencies, thank you for the opportunity to address the council on this vital issue. I specifically want to thank the United States government for the invitation to speak today and for the generous support of the American people for conventional weapons disposal programs worldwide. I'm here today on behalf of The HALO Trust to outline how conventional weapons assessments and disposal are necessary to support safe access to sites potentially containing chemical weapons in Syria.
(07:35)
At the outset, I underscore HALO's view that the Syrian government is committed to removing and destroying all chemical weapons threats in the country in a timely and transparent way and to removing the obstacles to this process. The HALO Trust stands ready to support it alongside international partners. The remnants of chemical weapons in Syria cannot be assessed and destroyed unless OPCW inspection teams can safely access and traverse weapon storage sites that have been previously bombed and are likely awash with deadly unexploded conventional ordinance.
(08:09)
Addressing explosive contamination is only one of several impediments to accessing these sites of interest, but with the right support and investment, it is an easy and practical impediment to remove. To fulfill these goals, three conditions must be met. One, an organization with the requisite expertise needs to be funded to begin immediately assessing explosive contamination at the sites in question, and once positively identified, start removing any explosives which block access to the sites.
(08:44)
Two, a capacity building project with the newly formed Syrian National Mine Action Center, NMAC, needs to be established to build, train, and mentor Syrian national teams in the range of capabilities needed to carry forward this work. Three, NMAC needs to be supported for the establishment of such a capacity and for its running costs until such a time as the Syrian government can support NMAC itself.
(09:10)
The HALO Trust is an international NGO founded in 1988 and registered in the UK and the US. We are best known for the clearance of landmines, but other core elements of our work are dealing with all types of conventional explosives, including airdropped weapons and guided weapons and improvised explosive devices. We have particularly strong experience of the clear up of unplanned explosions at weapons storage sites. Our operational model is to train and develop the staff of our host nations to the very highest levels, keeping the expatriate footprint to an absolute minimum.
(09:45)
We also work closely with national authorities and national partners to enhance long-term resilient capabilities. This model has been adapted to deliver results across regions and countries from Angola to Lao to Ukraine and many others, including seven Middle Eastern states. HALO has been operating in Syria since 2016 and since January 2025, we have grown from 40 to 250 staff, 240 of whom are Syrian. We are now working in seven governorates where we are conducting surveys of suspected minefields, landmine clearance, explosive ordinance disposal, and explosive ordinance risk education.
(10:27)
We have built strong relations with local populations, the NMAC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, governors and municipalities across Syria, UN institutions, and civil society. HALO has not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of locations of potential interest to the OPCW, but we understand conventional weapon threats at sites inhibits safe access. These threats could include perimeter and internal minefields, abandoned weapons, and booby traps or improvised explosive devices. Some sites have been subject to air strikes, leaving the site strewn with volatile unexploded bombs, shells, and other ordinance.
(11:09)
Working alongside the Syrian NMAC, a conventional weapons team needs to make initial assessments of each site. Depending on the threats assessed, a number of response options could be deployed, including explosive ordinance disposal or EOD, landmine clearance, high risk search, improvised explosive device disposal, or teams with armored machines to clear safe paths through sites that have been bond. To ensure the safety of everyone involved, the explosive disposal capacity will need strong coordination and integration with all stakeholders, including NMAC, chemical weapons specialists and inspectors, medical and decontamination teams, the logistics support capacity, and local hospitals.
(11:56)
While support from international organizations will be needed at the outset, the Syrian government is committed to developing its national capabilities to perform the vital work of explosive disposal itself. A two-year capacity building project can fulfill this goal, providing training and mentorship to the highest internationally recognized standards. HALO is discussing with the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NMAC a memorandum of understanding to govern this work.
(12:26)
Further, in developing this capability to international standards and enabling safe access to sites of interest for chemical weapons with an international partner such as HALO, this work provides an entry point for Syria and the international community to jointly build confidence in the security sector. All of this costs money, but the likely return on these investments is high, both in terms of facilitating the destruction of any remaining chemical weapon stores and in building the capacity of the Syrian government to meet ongoing explosive needs. In summary, though there are many challenges to accessing chemical weapons in Syria, the blockage created by conventional weapons is one that can be addressed. HALO and similar organizations have been conducting this work for decades. We know how to achieve results safely to the highest international standards, deploying locally trained staff. If resources match ambition, it can be done. Most immediately, we need to get on with assessing every site to develop a clear sense of the timeframe and costs required for conventional weapons disposal at the sites.
(13:36)
Madam President, excellencies, we stand at a critical juncture where real progress can be made in Syria with Syrians for Syrians. HALO stands ready with our national and international partners to undertake this work with the urgency required. Thank you.
Speaker 1 (13:54):
I thank Mr. Moore for his briefing. And I now give the floor to Mr. Lennie Phillips.
Mr. Lennie Phillips (14:04):
Good morning. I'm Lenny Phillips, a senior research fellow in the Royal United Services Institute, RUSI. But as a small bit of relevant historical background, I joined the OPCW as an inspector in 2008, and in 2013 was part of the mission that verified the destruction of Syria's declared chemical weapons production capability. This involved visiting a variety of sites throughout the country that were controlled by Assad's forces. It's also worth noting that equipment and chemicals were removed from sites prior to them being taken by what was then the opposition forces, and they were secured in sites in Assad-held areas visited by OPCW teams.
(14:49)
And in this context, Assad's CW team always maintained that they never lost control of their chemical weapons and associated infrastructure. Between 2015 and 2017, I was the team leader for the OPCW Fact Finding Mission, the FFM. From those investigations, it was clear that Assad's team had not declared all of their chemical weapons program. So where are we now? There's a new government in Syria that has no institutional knowledge of the Assad-era Chemical Weapons Program. Documentation of the program, whether held centrally or locally, is likely to be limited, if available at all, and would not have been updated if CW material had been moved at short notice in the last weeks of Assad's hold on the country.
(15:40)
Personnel, especially senior personnel involved with the CW program, may be able to offer insights. However, given their track record of obfuscation for over 10 years and a vested interest in extending verification activities, any input should be treated with a great deal of skepticism. Once potential sites have been located, they need to be visited and assessed for their relevance to the CWC. Intact sites present their own hazards such as mines, explosives, remnants of war, booby traps, contamination, et cetera. And we've just heard about that from Andrew. Sites that have been damaged by attacks are likely to have all these hazards mixed up in rubble, making access, nevermind verification, very difficult. Once identified, the technical secretariat, the TS, need to visit relevant facilities and commence verification activities as soon as it's practical, given the potential difficulties in providing long-term security for all facilities. The chemical weapons themselves need to be relocated to consolidation areas while they awake destruction. Weapons that can't be moved need to be verifiably destroyed in line with EC- 110 Decision 1, the expedited onsite destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The facilities themselves would then need to be verifiably destroyed.
(17:14)
Processes and equipment for destruction of the chemical weapons need to be designed, procured, and operated with ultimate verification of that destruction. This, in itself, is not straightforward, given that the identity of the chemicals and their quantities are currently unknown. So what is needed? What has been very apparent is that the responsibility for declaring the Assad-era chemical weapons has been taken very seriously by the new government, trying to operate in very difficult circumstances and circumstances not just related to chemical weapons.
(17:50)
This is not a case of throw some money at it and the problem will get solved. This is about giving Syria the capability and capacity to locate and destroy the former CW program in a verifiable manner while maintaining the capability to update declarations and implement destruction in future, should further chemical weapons be found, for example, in a cave near a former storage facility. There are countries with intelligence on the former CW program who could share relevant information on the location of sites and thus aid the process of identifying relevant sites. The infrastructure is such that Syria is unlikely to be able to design and construct destruction facilities themselves.
(18:38)
There are several states parties with experience in destruction, including some that have not destroyed or dismantled their destruction processes and could make relevant equipment available along with training and expertise in operation. There are companies that can provide training to be able to identify toxic environments, operate in them, take samples and analyze them while building capacity for self-sufficiency for those occasions when undeclared chemical weapons are discovered somewhere in the country.
(19:10)
There are people who are available to work alongside Syrians, to visit facilities, help differentiate between chemical and conventional weapons, understand verification requirements, and make judgments on the most suitable destruction technology. I could go on, but those requirements are best heard from Syria themselves. It's hard to look at where we are now without a nod to the past. In the Northern hemisphere, we're at the start of spring. Spring is often hailed as an era of regrowth, warmer and lengthening days, a resurgence after water often cold and dismal winters.
(19:50)
In former opposition held areas of Syria, spring marked the start of chemical weapons season. This was when weather conditions often favored the deployment and heightened the impact of chemical weapons. There are many people who lost family members too, have had their physical health impacted by and are still traumatized by the use of chemical weapons, whether this be chlorine, sarin, or other chemicals. These people will never get back what they lost, but they do deserve justice. They deserve justice and accountability, not just for themselves, but also to send a message that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and that perpetrators of use will be held accountable.
(20:34)
The Geneva protocol was adopted over a hundred years ago, based on the horrors of the use of chemical warfare agents in the trenches of World War I. Instead of adhering to this protocol, we seem to have moved away from using chemical weapons only on troops, and by lack of accountability, have now found it acceptable to use chemical weapons on civilians. In my opinion, this is why we need to get rid of the Assad-era chemical weapons, not so much because it's a requirement of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but so we can concentrate on accountability and send a message that the use of chemical weapons is indeed prohibited, and if you use them, one day you will also be held accountable. Thank you very much for your time.
Speaker 1 (21:23):
I thank Mr. Phillips for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States. Thank you to our briefers for their representations today. The United States welcomes the continued progress made by the Syrian government and the OPCW towards locating and destroying any remnants of the Assad regime's chemical weapons program. We welcome Syria's efforts to provide the OPCW access to relevant sites and are encouraged by the spirit of cooperation between them. We urge the Syrians to redouble their efforts as they turn the page of this dark chapter of Syria's history.
(22:07)
We also remind all member states of the need to support both the OPCW and Syria, so they can operate effectively and safely on the ground. The United States is proud to be working alongside Syria and six other partner nations in the Syria-led destruction planning group. This group was established to support Syria's chemical weapons destruction effort, strengthen Syrian national capacities, and mobilize technical and operational support for this mission.
(22:40)
We also welcome the release of the fifth report by the OPCW investigation and identification team. On events of October 1st, 2016 in Kafr Zita, this is a significant milestone as it is the first report produced by the IIT since the Syrian government granted full and unfettered access to its territory. We hope this report will aid Syria and other efforts to identify and eventually hold to account those responsible for the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people.
(23:19)
In this regard, we also welcome the efforts of the Syrian National Commission on Transitional Justice to investigate the use of chemical weapons as part of its broader effort to uncover the truth about atrocities perpetuated by the Assad regime. Taken together, these actions represent real progress toward achieving the aims and obligations set out in Security Council Resolution 2118. Finally, we welcome the Security Council ISIL Da'esh and Al-Qaeda Sanction Committee's decision to remove Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham from the sanctions regime, which together with other recent sanctions relief should further enable member states to provide counter CW assistance to Syria.
(24:12)
Finding, securing, declaring, and verifiably destroying any remnants of the Assad regime's chemical weapons program is no easy task, and is therefore costly. The United States echoes the calls by the OPCW Director General and the Technical Secretariat for voluntary, monetary, and in kind contributions to its Syrian mission. We thank the council members who have contributed to the OPCW's work and call on all council members to continue to prioritize this critical matter until the work is done. I resume my function now as president of the council. I give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation.
Speaker 2 (25:07):
Madam President, we thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Adedeji Ebo. Thank you for your briefing. At the same time, we wish to express our dismay, given that the US presidency invited to today's meeting to civil society representatives. In line with established practice, the only briefer at the Syrian Chemical Weapons Dossi meetings has for a long time been the hybrid representative for disarmament affairs or her deputy, who briefs council members about the content of the OPCW Technical Secretariat's reports. Other briefings, we believe such briefings to be an unreasonable waste of time and resources of the security
Speaker 3 (26:00):
... council. Madam President, we read very carefully the latest report drafted by the OPCW Director General Fernando Arias. We take a positive view of the approach demonstrated by the Syrian transitional government, a constructive approach together with the OPCW on the Syrian chemicals dossier. The Russian Federation has consistently spoken out in favor of swiftly resolving outstanding issues linked to Syria's initial declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CWC. This would facilitate the closure of the Syrian chemicals dossier.
(26:39)
Unfortunately, we are compelled to note that the activities of the OPCW Technical Secretariat on Syria remain directed towards one objective, searching for supposedly concealed by the former government of elements of the Syrian Arab Republic's Military Chemicals Program, the objective being two level accusations of committing chemical crimes by the former government. The entire arsenal at the Technical Secretariat's disposal is being used to this end at the West's behest, including the illegitimate and biased body that is the identification and investigation team, the IIT. The latest report by the team dedicated to events that transpired 10 years ago is further evidence of this.
(27:29)
The thrust of the cumbersome 84 page document, which colleagues will surely heap praise on later today is the following. On the 1st of October, 2016 in Kafr Zita, in Hama Governorate, the Syrian Air Force supposedly deployed a chemical weapon, chlorine. And yet the report's contents are reminiscent of a B grade action movie. The cylinder containing chlorine fell from the sky and shattered upon impact. The gas that was released went into the ventilation shafts, and as a result, civilians died.
(28:09)
Now, if you consider the technical facts in the report carefully, a lot of questions arise. The IIT's conclusions are based on the outcomes of technical expertise of a chlorine cylinder purportedly found in Kafr Zita by the FFM, the fact-finding mission. Now, this expertise was conducted in violation of the chain of custody principle. Moreover, the FFM's work was conducted with the participation of unidentified third parties who were participating as experts. Now, there are serious doubts about the professionalism and competency of these third parties. What's also outrageous is that neither the FFM nor the IT members went to Kafr Zita due to security considerations, despite the fact that the new Syrian authorities gave them unfettered access to all sides and territories of interest to them.
(29:14)
We note that Mr. Arias' reports of last few months have been full of headline numbers, taking stock of the Assad government's wrongdoings, which supposedly concealed critical information about the Syrian military chemical program. Yet, aside from the figures, the Technical Secretariat is giving us neither testimonies nor evidence, which would provide information about the allegations being leveled. The fact is these are uncorroborated words which we're supposed to take at face value. Such an ultimatum's based approach, take it or leave it, is unacceptable.
(29:54)
Clearly, the Technical Secretariat's work in the Syrian Arab Republic is subordinate to just one goal. And this is very disappointing that the 19 outstanding issues contained within the initial declaration under the CWC, nothing's been done to resolve them. Rather, there's a tireless search for evidence of a secret chemicals program to which we see conclusions about the chemical crimes of the former authorities being added.
(30:24)
In light of the above, we call on the OPCW Technical Secretariat to act professionally. An inability by the OPCW to do its job properly, as well as the principled unwillingness of the OPCW's Technical Secretariat's leadership to fix their methodology remain the key problem, a problem hampering the objectives of the Security Council Resolution 2118 being achieved. Until these challenges are tackled, it will not be possible to turn over this page in serious history. I thank you.
Speaker 4 (30:57):
I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.
Speaker 5 (31:05):
Thank you, president. And my thanks to Director Ebo, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Phillips for their insightful and highly relevant briefings. And I welcome the participation of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkiye in our meeting today. The United Kingdom remains resolute in its commitment to eradicating the threat posed by chemical weapons in Syria. We welcome the 22nd January publication of the fifth organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Investigation and Identification team report. The report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force, under the former Assad regime, carried out the chlorine attack on Kafr Zita on 1st of October, 2016, injuring at least 35 people. Its findings add to an already extensive body of evidence confirming a systematic pattern of chemical weapons use by the former Assad regime.
(32:04)
Publication of this report is a significant milestone. It is the first attribution report to have received direct support from a Syrian government. It demonstrates Syria's commitment to accountability and represents a crucial step towards truth and justice. The United Kingdom thanks the OPCW Technical Secretariat staff for their unwavering dedication and professionalism in the pursuit of attribution. And we look forward to the conclusion of other ongoing and future investigations into chemical weapons attacks in Syria.
(32:41)
President, the progress made by the Syrian government and the OPCW provides a genuine opportunity to eradicate the threat of Assad era chemical weapons once and for all. However, progress is neither inevitable nor assured. As we stated in this council in January, and as the OPCW Director General has reaffirmed at the executive council meeting in the Hague today, significant and sustainable additional financial and in kind support from the international community remains essential to ensure the safe, verifiable, and rapid elimination of Assad's chemical weapons program.
(33:22)
The United Kingdom has contributed over $3.8 million to the OPCW's Syria missions since the fall of Assad. We encourage other states parties who have not previously supported Syria related destruction activities financially to contribute at the earliest opportunity. For our part, we will continue to provide technical expertise to both Syria and the OPCW. Colleagues, let us not squander this window of opportunity. Together, we can support Syria and the OPCW to make further progress to eliminate Assad's chemical weapons program and help to ensure those responsible for chemical weapons use are held to account. I thank you.
Speaker 4 (34:07):
I thank the representative from the United Kingdom for the statement, and I now give the floor to the representative of Liberia.
Speaker 6 (34:17):
Thank you, Madam President. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the A3 members, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and my own country, Liberia. We thank the Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for his briefing, and we have listened carefully to Mr. Moores and Mr. Phillips' remarks. We welcome the participation of the permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in today's meeting. Madam President, at the outset, the A3 reiterates its unwavering commitment to serious sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity.
(35:14)
The A3 reaffirms our commitment to the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons anywhere by anyone and under any circumstance. Upholding this principle is therefore, not merely a legal obligation, it is a moral imperative. We further underscore that accountability, cooperation, and verification remain indispensable to upholding the convention's integrity.
(36:08)
Against this backdrop, the A3 wishes to highlight the following. First, we note the Secretary General's letter transmitting the 149th monthly report of the Director General of the OPCW, which reflects continued technical progress and engagement between the Syrian government and the Technical Secretariat. We welcome the continued organization of activities through the Office of Special Missions and the reestablishment of a continuous OPCW mission presence in the Syrian Arab Republic since October of 2025. These developments, alongside the reestablished national authority and the appointment of a new permanent representative to the OPCW, demonstrate a constructive framework for sustained cooperation shown by the Syrian government at this critical juncture.
(37:23)
Second, the A3 welcomes the successful deployment conducted during the reporting period, specifically the visit to the Aleppo area from 27th to 29th January 2026 to assess storage containers and cylinders. We further acknowledge the Syrian government's cooperation in handing over 34 boxes of documentation in Damascus on 15th January 2026. This collection of over 6,000 documents in the ongoing analysis of samples and witness interviews represent indispensable steps toward building international trust and providing necessary clarifications on the Syrian Chemical Weapons Program.
(38:26)
Third, while progress is important, clarity remains essential. The A3 supports the ongoing work of the Technical Secretariat to address the remaining outstanding issues, including those involving potentially undeclared chemical welfare agents and munitions. However, we note with concern the reports regarding the disappearance and reported destruction of undeclared cylinders in the Aleppo area. We encourage the Syrian government to provide the results of its ongoing investigation toward the Secretariat to ensure all verification requirements are indeed met.
(39:21)
Fourth, the A3 recognizes the importance of the needs and gaps assessment prepared by the Secretariat, therefore, the work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat must continue to receive the support it requires. The A3 urges the international community to ensure that the Secretariat has both the financial and technical resources necessary to carry out its mandate effectively. Madam President, while we are encouraged by the technical progress, we remain concerned by the broader security environment. The A3 underlines that sustainable progress requires the full and sustained cooperation between the Syrian government and the OPCW. Adequate international funding and technical resources and the prevention of chemical weapons or related materials from falling into the hands of criminals or terrorist groups cannot be downplayed.
(40:39)
To conclude, Madam President, history reminds us that difficult disarmament challenges are rarely resolved in a single moment. They are resolved through persistence, cooperation, and a steady commitment to transparency. When those elements come together, even the most complex files can be resolved. Therefore, the A3 encourages continued dialogue and pragmatic engagement between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW to resolve all outstanding issues and permanently close this longstanding file. I thank you.
Speaker 4 (41:31):
I thank the representative of Liberia for the statement, and I now give the floor to the representative of Greece.
Speaker 7 (41:38):
Thank you, Madam President. At the outset, I would like to thank the Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Ebo for his briefing, as well as Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their remarks. I also welcome the participation of the permanent representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkiye to this meeting. As a fundamental principle, Greece strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time, and under any circumstances. It constitutes a grave violation of international law, and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
(42:22)
While the entire Middle East region is facing complex challenges and multiple crises, we reiterate our aspiration that the ongoing political transition in Syria will contribute to the resolution of the chemical weapons file, which remains the legacy and a consequence of the prolonged conflict. In this regard, I wish to highlight three points. First, my country commends the ongoing constructive cooperation between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian transitional authorities with a view to dismantling the Assad-era chemical weapons program, as well as to Syria fulfilling its applications under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We commence Syria for having reinitiated the regular monthly report, and we welcome the submission of four monthly national reports covering the period 15 of August 2025 to 15th of January, 2026.
(43:27)
However, we note with concern the recent handling of 75 cylinders of category three chemical weapons in the Aleppo region. We regret that the Secretariat received neither prior notification nor any subsequent information regarding the reported removal and destruction of these cylinders. Greece has taken note of the measures taken by Syria in response and encourages the Syrian National Authority to complete the inquiries into the matter as soon as possible and share the information with the Secretariat and the state parties. In addition, we repeat our call to Syrian National Authority to work closely with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in order to resolve the 19 remaining outstanding issues in Syria's initial declaration.
(44:25)
Second, we took note of the fifth OPCW Investigation and Identification Team report of the 21st of January, 2026, which found the Syrian Arab Air Force responsible for a chemical weapons attack in Kafr Zita on the 1st of October, 2016. We pay tribute to the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team for its thorough and professional work. It is now time to hold those responsible accountable, and provide justice for the victims.
(45:01)
Third, Greece remains committed to supporting the OPCW, including through its capacity as a member of the Executive Council, as well as through its pledge for a financial contribution to the OPCW Trust Fund for Syria missions, with a view to ensuring a full accountability for those responsible for these heinous crimes in Syria. Moreover, we are working closely with the competent Syrian authorities with a view to provide further assistance, in particular, training for the enhancement of the means and resources of Syria in order to implement its obligations from the convention.
(45:44)
Madam President, to conclude, we reiterate our full support to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Syria, as well as to a fully inclusive Syrian-led and Syrian owned political transition. In the spirit of the UN Security Council Resolution 2054, 2254, and call for the unity of the council into upholding resolution 2118 and the international norm against any use of chemical weapons. I thank you.
Speaker 4 (46:17):
I thank the representative of Greece for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Latvia.
Speaker 8 (46:24):
Thank you, Madam President. Let me begin by thanking Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Ebo for his informative briefing, and also Director General of the OPCW for the report. And let me thank the invited briefers, Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their contributions. And I welcome the participation of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkiye to this meeting.
(46:52)
Madam President, chemical weapons as prohibited weapons of mass destruction under international law pose a grave threat and real danger to international peace and security and recent repeated violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, therefore reinforce the importance of safeguarding the norm against their use anywhere. In January of this year, the OPCW published the fifth report of the Investigation and Identification Team, which concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that on 1st October 2016, the Syrian Arab Air Force used chlorine gas. We also acknowledge and appreciate Syria's cooperation with the OPCW to conclude this investigation.
(47:37)
The findings of this report are deeply disturbing, but it is crucial that evidence of their use has seen the light of day. It is proof that accountability prevails and the facts will be revealed. The use of chemical weapons is completely unacceptable anywhere at any time and by anyone. We must ensure that the taboo on the use of chemical weapons remains in force and that such cases are investigated promptly and thoroughly and perpetrators are identified and held to account.
(48:08)
Madam President, we must also undertake all efforts to swiftly identify and eliminate all remnants of chemical weapons in Syria, thereby upholding international norms and preventing diversion of chemical weapons related materials to terrorists and other malign actors. The recent situation in the Aleppo area where the Technical Secretariat team and officials from the Syrian National Authority discovered that a dozen large volume storage containers for chemical precursors have been emptied and 75 undeclared cylinders of potential chemical components had disappeared or was said to be destroyed is a matter of concern.
(48:47)
The work done by the Technical Secretariat in Syria is crucial and robust cooperation with the new Syrian authorities has been key. And we encourage both sides to maintain and strengthen their constructive corporation, including for identifying and investigating the potential sites. And we are pleased to see the ongoing political and economic reforms in the country and hope that they will contribute to fostering greater technical capabilities in addressing the threat of chemical weapons. And it is clear that due to secretive and complex nature of the Assad regimes chemical weapons program, regional and international financial and technical support is needed to assist the OPCW and the new Syrian authorities in achieving their elimination.
(49:35)
Madam President, in conclusion, let me reiterate Latvia's appreciation for the good work of the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat, as well as for the good faith corporation of the new Syrian authorities as we strive towards Syria free of chemical weaponry. I thank you.
Speaker 4 (49:52):
I thank the representative of Latvia for the statement. I give the floor now to the representative of Bahrain.
Speaker 9 (50:03):
[foreign language 00:50:03]. Madam President, at the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Adedeji Ebo for his briefing before the members of the Security Council on the latest monthly report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2118. I also welcome the participation of the permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of Turkiye. And I welcome the remaining briefers in today's meeting.
(50:37)
Madam President, we are participating in today's meeting as the Middle East continues to face grave challenges, notably, the wanton Iranian aggression, the unjustified aggression against my country, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and a number of GCC countries and Arab countries through missile attacks against civilian cities in Bahrain, including Sitra and our capital Manama. These have resulted in a number of death and grave injuries among civilians. It also damaged civilian and private facilities. It terrified civilians during the blessed month of Ramadan. These are wanton unjustified attacks. These are crimes that run counter to the principles of international law and our religious beliefs. They run counter to all our humanitarian values. In this regard, these dangerous
Representative of Bahrain (52:00):
Iranian attacks reflect the number of challenges confronting regional security and stability. We need to recommit to the principles of good neighborliness to respect the sovereignty of countries and not to interfere in their internal affairs. We also need to strengthen international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to address their dangers in order to reduce regional tensions and maintain international peace and security.
(52:32)
The Kingdom of Bahrain renews its emphasis on the importance of ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction without any exception. This is a strategic choice to strengthen our collective security and to strengthen stability and to build a future based on cooperation, development, and peace. The Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirms its full support to the Chemical Weapons Convention as the main pillar for disarmament and non-proliferation. We remain committed to international law and to strengthening international security and peace.
(53:19)
We fully condemn the use of chemical weapons under any circumstance. It is important to hold those responsible accountable in order to protect civilians and to maintain international security and stability. In this regard, allow me to address the following points. First, the Kingdom of Bahrain values the content of the report of the Director-General of the OPCW. This report contained important information and clarifications on the latest developments regarding the chemical weapons file in the Syrian Arab Republic. We also value the efforts made by the OPCW to implement its mandate, including its cooperation and coordination with the Syrian government in the current period.
(54:14)
We call on the international community to provide the necessary support to the OPCW to strengthen compliance with international obligations and provide the necessary conditions to close this file permanently. Second, the report referred to ongoing field activities carried out by the OPCW and referred to strengthening coordination with the Syrian government, including visits to over 20 locations, the gathering of a number of samples, as well as carrying out technical interviews. This shows positive signs that there is willingness to cooperate in the current period. We believe that this cooperation is an important opportunity that should be supported and built upon to allow the OPCW to carry out its functions without any obstacles. We also welcome the steps taken by the Syrian government to facilitate communication with the OPCW teams and to provide information and documents, including the handover of a number of boxes that include relevant documents, and we encourage to continue this approach to uncover the truth and address the remaining issues in a technical, professional, and objective manner.
(55:49)
Third, we took note of what was mentioned in the report on the disappearance of a number of cylinders that are linked to chemical activities. We welcome the investigations carried out by the Syrian government in this regard in order to achieve transparency and cooperation with the OPCW.
(56:10)
In conclusion, Madam President, the Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirms the need to fully implement Security Council Resolution 2118 in order to fully eliminate the remainder of the chemical weapons in Syria. And we call for collective action to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, and we call for the international community to continue to support the Syrian Arab Republic during this period. I thank you.
Madam President (56:43):
I thank the Representative of Bahrain for the statement. I give the floor now to the Representative of Colombia.
Representative of Colombia (56:57):
Madam President, I thank the United States as president of the Security Council for this month for convening this meeting. Moreover, I thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ebo, and I thank the other briefers that honor us with their participation.
(57:18)
We reiterate our unequivocal repudiation of the use of chemical weapons by any state, organization, or individual, under any circumstances and to any end. Moreover, we reiterate our recognition for the technical, transparent, and impartial work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW. The organization's work remains crucial in order to uphold both the convention and the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
(57:50)
Madam President, in light of the above and the information received, we wish to highlight three points. First, the value of the technical findings and the need to place victims and survivors at the heart of all efforts. We have taken note of the submission of the most recent monthly reports of the OPCW and of the submission of the fifth report from the investigation and identification team. We've noted the conclusions of all of those documents.
(58:26)
With that in mind, we express our concern at the results that the reports bring to light and the conclusion that there is sufficient grounds to believe that indeed chemical weapons were used on Syrian territory. Consequently, we appeal for efforts to be made to ensure that the information contained in the report be used as material, which together with political will, can contribute to guaranteeing effective access to justice and to moving towards ensuring the accountability of those believed to be responsible for the use of such weapons. Impunity does not only prolong victim suffering. Rather, it also constitutes an obstacle for peace building.
(59:18)
Our second point. We wish to underscore the sustained cooperation between the transitional government and the need to ensure verifiable compliance with the Conventional Chemical Weapons. My delegation recognizes the cooperation and the assistance that the transitional government has provided to the activities of the OPCW. This is reflected in the report submitted. Maintaining and broadening this cooperation will be of paramount importance in order to ensure full clarification regarding the scope of the chemical weapons program and in order to ensure Syria's sustained compliance with its international obligations. Colombia values the submission of reports by the Syrian authorities.
(01:00:10)
We welcome that move, and we urge the government to continue with necessary actions to respond comprehensively, transparently, and in a timely fashion to the documentation and information requests made by the competent bodies. My third point is this. We must ensure the preservation of evidence, the integrity of relevant sites, and there is a need to move towards the definitive resolution of outstanding issues. Colombia notes with concern the fact that the latest monthly report reiterates that operational limitations remain. These could jeopardize both the preservation of evidence and the integrity of both declared and suspected sites. In view of the current regional conflict, the context rather marked by military actions and by volatile security conditions, safeguarding these sites is more crucial now than ever before. Moreover, information reported by OPCW indicates that outstanding issues remain regarding possibly significant quantities of chemical munitions and agents which have not yet been declared or verified. Consequently, we reiterate our appeal for the adoption without delay of measures aimed at adequately protecting these sites and measures aimed at preventing the loss or tampering with evidence.
(01:01:48)
It is only in that way that we will be able to preserve the conditions necessary to verifiably resolve matters which continue to require clarification, and it's only in that way that we will be able to move towards the definitive resolution of outstanding issues. Madam President, to conclude, Colombia reiterates its support for the renewed cooperation between the transitional government and relevant organizations in the multilateral arena.
(01:02:19)
Actions liable to lead to the verifiable and lasting closure of this file can make a tangible contribution to both security and stability. Colombia has remained consistent within this chamber in its appeals to avoid all forms of violence and to defend the peaceful resolution of conflict.
(01:02:45)
Moreover, or rather consequently, in a key period for Syria, a country seeking to move towards peace in a context marked by violence and the proliferation of conflict, no effort aimed at guaranteeing justice, accountability, and the respect for international law can be dismissed as too small. Thank you.
Madam President (01:03:12):
I thank the Representative of Colombia for the statement. I now give the floor to the Representative of Pakistan.
Representative of Pakistan (01:03:20):
Thank you very much, Madam President. I thank Mr. Ebo, Director and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for the briefing. We also take note of the remarks by Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips. Pakistan attaches great importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention as a pillar of the global disarmament regime. We support calls for the convention's universal adherence and its full effective and non-discriminatory implementation. Pakistan reiterates its firm opposition to the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances.
(01:03:58)
We strongly support Syria's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Important opportunities have come up in Syria to advance reconciliation, recovery, peace, and stability. It is imperative to turn these opportunities into concrete progress on the ground through inclusive political process, international engagement, and support. The security situation in Syria is seriously affected by foreign military occupation of parts of the country and airstrikes that also impact the OPCW's work.
(01:04:34)
The risk of terrorism and presence of foreign terrorist fighters also pose a challenge to the country's security and affect the OPCW's verification activities. It is important to address these factors to enable a conducive environment for resolution of chemical weapons related issues in Syria at the earliest.
(01:04:55)
Madam President, Pakistan appreciates the commitment of the Syrian authorities to fully implement the CWC and lauds its cooperation to secure suspected chemical weapon sites and address outstanding issues, and welcomes the progress achieved thus far. The OPCW Technical Secretariat must continue to be enabled to carry out its independent verification to eliminate suspected chemical weapons in Syria and any risk of proliferation in compliance with the CWC.
(01:05:28)
Enhancing the capacity of Syrian authorities would contribute to the work of the OPCW, including in declaration, investigation, analysis, and verification on expedited basis. We hope that the continued engagement between the technical secretariat and Syrian authorities will further build on the positive momentum to resolve all outstanding issues at the earliest. I thank you very much.
Madam President (01:05:54):
I thank the Representative of Pakistan for the statement, and I now give the floor to the Representative of Panama.
Representative of Panama (01:06:03):
Thank you, Madam President. I thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Adedeji Ebo. I thank Andrew Moore, Regional Director at The HALO Trust, and Lennie Phillips, Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. I thank them all for their briefings. Moreover, I wish to warmly welcome to the chamber the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and of Türkiye. They honor us today with their participation.
(01:06:38)
In the current context of regional instability, the chemical weapons in Syria file remains a pivotal issue for the international community. Panama welcomes the recent indications of cooperation by the Syrian authorities with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW. We commend the restoration at the end of 2025 of its continued presence on Syrian territory. We are of the view that this progress constitute a decisive step forward towards the total elimination of chemical weapons in Syria.
(01:07:22)
And we reaffirm the fact that the fundamental principle according to which the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances and by any act is unacceptable and runs counter to international law. We view as timely the investigative efforts designed to shed light on the use of chemical agents in the context of the conflict in Syria. With this in mind, we take note of the conclusions presented in the most recent report of the Director-General of the OPCW.
(01:07:54)
That report identifies reasonable grounds to have attributed to the Syrian Air Force under the orders of the al-Assad regime an attack with chlorine, which occurred in 2016 in Kafr Zeita. This was an incident which is thought to have affected dozens of civilians. We are of the view that these technical and rigorous efforts are of crucial importance to guarantee that the use of chemical weapons neither continues nor goes unpunished or rather, we must provide verifiable information to the justice system such that they can hold accountable those that use these weapons.
(01:08:42)
The accountability is a vital pillar to strengthen the credibility of the international system for non-proliferation and the prohibition of chemical weapons. Accountability is also vital in order to reaffirm our collective commitment to protecting civilians. Elsewhere, the disappearance and presumed destruction of 75 undeclared cylinders in January of this year in the Aleppo region lays bare the need to bolster oversight mechanisms and to guarantee unfettered access to all relevant sites.
(01:09:19)
Madam President, chemical disarmament is not solely a matter of technical compliance. It represents, first and foremost, above all, a collective responsibility in terms of defending international humanitarian law and upholding international security. Acting in accordance with that premise does not only protect the international community, rather, it also recognizes the suffering that the Syrian people has endured during years of conflict and the commitment that that very same people has demonstrated moving towards peace and security. Panama reiterates the importance of strengthening cooperation, of facilitating full and timely access to information and experts and relevant sites, and the importance of guaranteeing both the human and financial resources necessary to complete this process irreversibly and once and for all. This in order to guarantee that the achievements garnered sustain over time and to ensure that the Syrian people are able to live free of the threat of chemical weapons. Thank you.
Madam President (01:10:35):
I thank the Representative of Panama for the statement. I now give the floor to the Representative of Denmark.
Representative of Denmark (01:10:41):
Thank you, Madam President. Let me also thank Mr. Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative for his briefing, as well as Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their valuable insights. I also welcome the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye to our meeting. In Syria, we have witnessed a positive development with the transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces reaching a comprehensive agreement in January.
(01:11:07)
It is key to continue the ongoing implementation of this agreement, and we urge the parties to prioritize the peaceful integration of the Northeast as part of the political transition. Also, it's important to avoid the transition being undermined by wider regional tensions.
(01:11:24)
Madam President, turning to the issue of chemical weapons in Syria. Denmark supports the effective and comprehensive closure of this file, while also securing accountability for the atrocious crimes committed by the Assad regime against the Syrian people. The task of destroying all remaining chemical weapons in Syria is already complex. With the continued presence and threat of Da'esh and other terrorist groups in Syria, it grows even more important. Counter-proliferation efforts must therefore be prioritized so no chemical weapons fall into the hands of terrorists. Madam President, Syria has identified challenges in the safe disposal of chemical agents and precursors, both lacking the means and relevant expertise. The OPCW's assistance is critical in this regard. We urge all actors to extend technical and financial assistance to Syria and the OPCW. We also call in Syria to ensure that all chemical agents and stockpiles are accounted for and safely stored until their eventual destruction. In line with Resolution 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention, all transportation and destruction of chemical weapons must be coordinated with the OPCW.
(01:12:43)
Madam President, accountability remains a cornerstone of successful political transition in Syria. This also means accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. All victims of the Assad regime's illegal and heinous chemical weapons attacks deserve justice. In this regard, we welcome the 5th report of the investigation and identification team on the 2016 chemical attack in Kafr Zeita.
(01:13:11)
The people of Syria have waited too long for the victims of chemical attacks to be identified and recognized. Denmark calls on all actors to redouble their efforts to this end. Madam President, in closing, let me reiterate Denmark's strong support to the OPCW and Syria in making further progress towards concluding the chemical weapons file this year. Thank you.
Madam President (01:13:35):
I thank the Representative of Denmark for the statement, and I now give the floor to the Representative of France.
Representative of France (01:13:46):
Thank you, Madam President. I would like to thank the Deputy of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Mr. Andrew Moore from The HALO Trust, and Mr. Lennie Phillips, the former Head of Inspections in Syria for the OPCW. I also welcome the Representative of Syria to our debate. We're meeting at a very serious juncture, a time when the Middle East is once again in need of peace.
(01:14:22)
Just over a year ago, Syria committed itself to a political transition, the ambition being to become a factor, a driver of stability and peace in the regional environment. France fully supports the Syrian authorities as they undertake a peaceful political transition that is also inclusive and respects all of the groups that make up Syrian society in keeping with the spirit of the principles enshrined in Security Council Resolution 2254. The complete and verifiable destruction of the chemical weapons program inherited from the Bashar al-Assad regime is a strategic stepping stone on the way to successfully undertaking the transition.
(01:15:06)
The Bashar al-Assad regime had, on numerous occasions, used chemical weapons against its own population. A recent report tabled by the investigation team of the OPCW, and I'd like to highlight the OPCW's independence, neutrality, impartiality, and professionalism. Well, this report attributed responsibility to the Assad regime for a chemical weapons attack perpetrated in 2016 in Kafr Zeita. The memory of the victims compels us to continue working tirelessly to eliminate chemical weapons and to combat impunity for the use thereof.
(01:15:47)
For over a decade, and despite its succession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013, the Assad regime obstructed the OPCW's work. Today, it's clear that the regime never declared all of the elements making up its chemical weapons program, something that it is obligated to do under the CWC, which it claimed to have adhered to. Today, there are dark spots as regards the exact scope of the program. Localizing and destroying all of the chemical weapons stockpiles are an absolute priority for the region's security and for preventing proliferation risks. The new Syrian authorities have decided to begin a new era, committing itself to fully cooperating with the OPCW.
(01:16:42)
We applaud the progress made to date, including the multiple deployments by the OPCW team since 2025, the appointment by Syria of a new permanent representative to the OPCW, the adoption in October 2025 of a decision, an adoption by the Executive Council of the OPCW, a decision allowing for the expedited destruction onsite of all of the remaining chemical weapons in Syria.
(01:17:09)
This cooperation dynamic should continue to ensure, as soon as possible, the complete elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Program. Ongoing concrete progress will allow us to eventually restore Syria's rights and privileges as a state's party to the CWC. These rights and privileges were suspended in 2021, ridding Syria of the remains of the Assad-era chemical weapons program as an enormous task, as are Syria's needs and the needs of the OPCW to see this task through.
(01:17:41)
The last report by the Director-General of the OPCW shows that it's necessary to inspect over 100 sites, which were not declared by the previous regime, which could be involved in activities linked to chemical weapons. France, together with its partners, will support Syria in its efforts to accelerate the destruction of undeclared
Speaker 10 (01:18:00):
... chemical stockpiles to comply with its international commitments as swiftly as possible and to free the region and Syria from the onerous legacy of the Assad-era chemicals program.
(01:18:08)
Madam President, seeing through this Syrian Chemical Weapons Elimination Program means sending to the world three important messages, and this at a time of war and the WMD arms control regime being called into question.
(01:18:27)
First, the first message is that Syria is complying with its peace program and with the support of the international community.
(01:18:33)
Second, the universal ban on chemical weapons remains a priority objective that is unshakable.
(01:18:44)
Third, peace is a choice. A choice through which those who were subjected to might by right to war opt for reconciliation.
(01:18:58)
I thank you.
President (01:18:59):
I thank the representative of France for the statement, and I now give the floor to the representative of China.
Speaker 12 (01:19:09):
[foreign language 01:19:08]
(01:19:09)
Thank you, President. I thank Deputy to the High Representative, Mr. Ebo, for his briefing. I welcome the presence of the representatives of Syria and Turkey at today's meeting.
(01:19:22)
China takes note of the OPCW monthly report transmitted by the Secretary General to the Security Council. The OPCW Technical Secretariat continued its active engagement with the Syrian transitional government on outstanding issues concerning chemical weapons in the country and conducted onsite investigations at 20 locations in Syria. China welcomes these developments and supports enhanced communication and cooperation between the two sides for an early and comprehensive closure of all outstanding issues.
(01:19:58)
China notes the recent report of OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team released by the Technical Secretariat. It must be pointed out that the IIT has been highly controversial since its inception. The accountability functions of the IIT and the Office of Special Missions exceed the mandate conferred by the CWC.
(01:20:24)
The OPCW should strictly abide by the verification provisions of the convention and its relevant annexes and uphold the principles of impartiality, objectivity and professionalism when investigating and handling alleged uses of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the conclusions can withstand the test of time and practice.
(01:20:49)
The 110th session of the Executive Council of the OPCW adopted a decision mandating the expedited onsite destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in Syria and requiring Syria to consult with the Technical Secretariat on the conditions for such destruction. Verifiability and irreversibility are the principles established by the Convention for Chemical Weapons Destruction and must be strictly adhered to.
(01:21:17)
President, counter-terrorism is one of the top priorities of the international community in addressing the Syria question. Last January, when the situation in Northeast Syria underwent a shift, some terrorists escaped from detention facilities amidst the chaos raising international concerns.
(01:21:38)
We call the Syrian transitional government to fulfill its international obligations and take all effective measures to resolutely combat all international terrorist organizations listed by the council, including the ETIM. Under no circumstances should terrorists be allowed to acquire, manufacture or use chemical weapons. Thank you, President.
President (01:22:03):
I thank the representative of China for the statement, and I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Speaker 13 (01:22:15):
[foreign language 01:22:14]
(01:22:15)
Thank you, Madam President. I congratulate you and your friendly country on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month, and I wish you every success.
(01:22:26)
I thank Mr. Ebo for his briefing and putting developments in their context, and I thank Mr. Moore for explaining the importance of international support regarding demining.
(01:22:39)
And I thank Mr. Phillips for his efforts over the past years, especially for outlining the roadmap towards the future, and I would like to thank him for referring to spring, what spring means to the world and what spring means in Syria.
(01:22:56)
Spring in the world means open air, means a light breeze. But in Syria, during these months, we had had two chemical attacks in Syria. Our children had been suffocating, but the truth is not being suffocated and will not be suffocated.
(01:23:21)
Madam President, Syria is committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention. This goes beyond merely illegal commitment. Considering our experience, we owe it to our people who were victims of chemical attacks who endured immense pain.
(01:23:37)
Now that these instruments are in the hands of the victims themselves, that commitment became a sacred pledge, an unwavering moral duty. As we attach utmost importance to achieving justice and preventing recurrence, Syria translated its commitment to the convention into practical action. Syria views the elimination of any possible remnants of the previous chemical program as a national responsibility, one that serves to safeguard the security and safety of all Syrians.
(01:24:18)
First and foremost, and to enhance the security and stability of the region, Syria is shouldering this responsibility amid major and complex challenges that some colleagues have referred to, including security and operational difficulties, the secrecy that surrounded the former regime's chemical program, the absence of institutional memory, and the legacy of 14 years of war that led to economic exhaustion and institutional fragility affecting technical capacities and human resources.
(01:24:58)
Madam President, despite all these challenges, Syria continues to cooperate with the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. It has taken a series of practical measures to strengthen this cooperation, including the establishment of a national working group.
(01:25:17)
As colleagues have mentioned, the Syrian national authority has continued to submit its monthly reports, reflecting enhanced transparency and regular institutional and technical communication with the organization and compliance by Syria with decisions of the Executive Council. The key field developments in recent months may be summarized as follows.
(01:25:41)
First, Syria facilitated visits to more than 25 suspected sites, including declared locations and others that might be linked to past activities. Environmental samples were collected during these visits and numerous documents were reviewed. The Syrian government provided all necessary support and facilitations, including movement, security and safety arrangements, especially as access to some sites required engineering surveys and demining operations, as Mr. Moore mentioned, before international teams could carry out their work.
(01:26:22)
Second, Syria also enabled the Technical Secretariat to examine more than 10,000 original documents and official records. The Secretariat conducted interviews with 19 witnesses, including individuals who had been associated with the chemical program during the era of the former regime.
(01:26:43)
Third, Syria continues to cooperate with OPCW teams in planning additional visits in the upcoming phase, including the assessment of priority sites and preparations for onsite destruction activities where conditions so require. Regarding accountability efforts, as you mentioned, the OPCW issued the fifth report of the Investigation and Identification Team. It concluded that there are reasonable ... That former regime's Air Forces were responsible for the chlorine attack that took place on the 1st October 2016 in Kafr Zita in rural Hama, which caused injuries to 35 persons and harmed dozens others.
(01:27:33)
The OPCW Director General welcomed the assistance provided by the Syrian government to the IIT, describing it as the first such cooperation since the fall of the former regime and the significant milestone, as he put it, contributing meaningfully to the international accountability process. Syrian authorities continue their cooperation with the team to advance investigations and ensure that all those involved in chemical attacks against the Syrian people are held accountable.
(01:28:13)
Madam President, in keeping with the principles of transparency and openness, the Syrian National Authority acted immediately when units of the Ministry of Defense discovered 75 old empty cylinders suspected of having once contained toxic chemical substances at an abandoned military site.
(01:28:38)
The authority took initiative and promptly informed the Technical Secretariat, expressed its readiness to provide all necessary facilitation for handling these cylinders and clarified that it had already reported the existence of these empty abandoned cylinders as part of its national declaration.
(01:28:57)
Syria even proposed transferring several of these cylinders to the OPCW headquarters in The Hague to showcase the success story that is attributed to the transparency, openness, cooperation and partnership between Syria and the organization.
(01:29:14)
The Technical Secretariat, however, preferred at that time to wait for some time, citing safety and security reasons. Unfortunately, the delay combined with the coordination lapse led to the cylinders being removed by personnel responsible for clearing the site and taken to a blacksmith's workshop outside the original location, where they were dismantled and destroyed as scrap metal. Those who have carried out this activity had been exposed to significant health risks.
(01:29:55)
Upon learning of this development, national authorities moved swiftly to contact the Technical Secretariat and to travel to the new location with the Secretariat team. It was confirmed that all cylinders were there, though dismantled, and all necessary safety and security precautions were taken.
(01:30:11)
Syria affirms that it is dealing with this matter with utmost seriousness. It has already provided the Technical Secretariat with essential information, including interviews with all individuals who dismantled the cylinders, with the commanding officers of the relevant military sites, as well as audio recordings and correspondence among those individuals. Samples were also collected from the site to which the empty dismantled cylinders had been transported.
(01:30:39)
This is incident. This demonstrates unequivocally the need for enhanced international support and capacity-building to ensure rapid and effective handling of any information or materials that may be discovered. Any action must be prompt and rapid.
(01:30:59)
Madam President, effectively addressing existing challenges remains difficult without the support of state's parties to the convention and international parties' support to Syria.
(01:31:13)
We would like to express our gratitude to the friendly countries that extended a helping hand to Syria from the very first moments after the fall of the former regime, assisting in dealing with its chemical legacy.
(01:31:28)
We are pleased to announce that work is underway to frame this cooperation within a comprehensive coordination mechanism that will be announced soon here in New York.
(01:31:42)
In conclusion, Madam President, distinguished colleagues, the chemical weapons file, which long preoccupied the world and this council and sparked widespread outrage and condemnation over the crimes committed against the Syrian people, this file, which one stood as a symbol of global shock, has today ceased to be the epitome of a tragedy. It has become a space for cooperation and partnership, allowing us to address challenges and ensure the safety and security of Syrians and the region. This transformation, distinguished colleagues, embodies the spirit of the new Syria in this same spirit.
(01:32:37)
Regarding another legacy that we inherited from the Assad regime, Syria is today convening a side event in Vienna to shed light on the profound transformation underway concerning the Captagon file, a file that has also long troubled the region and the world.
(01:32:58)
Just as the chemical file, the message to the international community is clear. These files will be dealt in a very different way. They will be closed once and for all. This stigma will be removed from our beloved Syria and the region and the world will be freed from these dangerous scourges.
(01:33:19)
I thank you, Madam President.
President (01:33:20):
I thank the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for the statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Turkiye.
Speaker 11 (01:33:30):
Thank you, Madam President. I would like to thank also Mr. Deputy High Representative, Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their comprehensive briefings.
(01:33:41)
Madam President, over the past decade, we have all witnessed how the instability generated by the former regime reverberated far beyond Syria's borders. The violent repression of the Syrian people and the policies pursued during the Assad era have left deep scars across the country and region.
(01:34:04)
Among the most painful legacies of that period is the chemical weapons file, which remains a dark reminder of the grave atrocities committed during the conflict. Addressing this legacy is essential not only for Syria's recovery, but also for regional and international security.
(01:34:25)
In the new period following December 24, the steps taken by the Syrian government to engage on this issue are encouraging. We acknowledge the progress made on the ground, thanks to Syria's determination and the professionalism of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the team, including the visit of numerous sites, the conduct of interviews and the collection of samples.
(01:34:54)
With respect to incident in Aleppo concerning the handling of cylinders that were discovered, we wish to underline the importance of effective communication between Syria and the Secretariat. We are also encouraged by the Syrian authority's commitment to ensuring accountability for chemical weapons attacks.
(01:35:17)
In this regard, we take note of fifth report of the Investigation and Identification Team on the chemical attack in Kafr Zita in 2016, which concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a Syrian Arab Air Force helicopter from the Assad era dropped a chlorine cylinder that injured 35 people.
(01:35:40)
We also note that this report marks the first instance of cooperation by the Syrian authorities with the Investigation and Identification Team since December 24.
(01:35:53)
Madam President, we all recognize that the chemical weapons file is highly technical and operationally complex. After years of concealment, significant information gaps remain regarding the former chemical weapons program. These gaps inevitably complicate verification efforts and operational planning.
(01:36:15)
In this context, the need to strengthen national institutional capacity in Syria to address the chemical weapons file is evident. Progress may not be immediate. However, gradual, practical and well-coordinated cooperation with Syria, aligned with the realities on the ground, can yield meaningful and sustainable results.
(01:36:37)
Turkiye remains committed to contributing Syria-led international efforts aimed at strengthening preparedness and technical capacity to address chemical weapons-related challenges in line with OPCW standards. In this regard, we have recently hosted a technical workshop in Ankara, bringing Syrian authorities involved and a group of countries and their experts, as well as OPCW Secretariat, to identify capacity gaps and discuss destruction, whether deliberate or expedited.
(01:37:14)
Madam President, the role of the OPCW in every stage remains important. We believe that a constructive and pragmatic approach will best serve our shared objective of achieving tangible progress on the ground. Engagement should, therefore, remain supportive, focused on practical outcomes and on gradual strengthening institutional capacity.
(01:37:39)
At the same time, we must ensure that the already challenging working conditions on the ground are not further undermined by unwarranted extra aggression from certain countries that is complicating ongoing efforts, namely Israel.
(01:37:56)
In closing, Turkiye reiterates its support for Syrian-led and Syrian-known initiatives to identify, secure, declare and destroy chemical weapons-related materials in cooperation with the OPCW and other relevant stakeholders. We also encourage all member states to support these efforts so that together we can advance toward our shared objective of a region free of chemical weapons.
(01:38:25)
Thank you very much, Madam President.
President (01:38:27):
I thank the representative of Turkiye for this statement, and there are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The meeting is adjourned.