State Department and Blinken Release Human Rights Reports

Good afternoon, everyone. I’m going to start by giving you the run of show today for the release of the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The Secretary will open it up with some opening comments, then take a couple of questions. He will be followed by Ambassador Robert Gilchrist, the senior official in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, who will give additional comments and then stay to take your questions about the report. And then I will follow up with any additional questions you have about the rest of the world.

(00:39)
With that, I’ll turn it over to the Secretary.

Thanks, Matt. Hey, good afternoon, everyone.

Good afternoon.

So I am pleased to be here to launch the 2023 Human Rights Report. At the end of last year, we marked the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, affirming the fundamental idea that ” All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Those words 75 years ago enshrined a wide range of universal rights, civil and political, economic, social, cultural, the right to express ourselves freely, to choose our leaders, to worship as we wish, the right to education, to just labor conditions.

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Standing up for freedom and human rights is simply the right thing to do, but defending and promoting this inalienable and universal rights is also profoundly in our national interest. Countries that respect human rights are more likely to be peaceful, prosperous, stable.

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The report that we’re putting out today presents a factual, systematic account of human rights records across nearly 200 countries and territories. Each one is held to the same standard, developed and developing countries, competitors, as well as allies and partners. While the report focuses on human rights challenges abroad, we recognize that the United States faces its own shortcomings. The strength of democracies like ours is that we address those shortcomings, those imperfections openly, without sweeping them under the rug.

(02:20)
The report illustrates that there is much work to be done to uphold the rights set out in the Universal Declaration. We once again see human rights and the rule of law under stress in more ways and in more places across the globe. Governments continue to lock up citizens who challenge those in power and call for a better future, from Belarus to Venezuela. Many are young. Of the roughly 1,000 political prisoners in Cuba, the average age is just 32.

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Tragically, as we saw with Alexei Navalny’s unjust imprisonment in a Russian penal colony, incarceration can come with horrific conditions, with abuse, even death. Governments like Russia also arbitrarily detain foreign nationals for political purposes, using human beings as bargaining chips. Paul Whelan, Evan Gershkovich, and every unjustly held individual deserves to go free. The United States and our many partners will keep working every day to reunite them with their families and to hold accountable governments that engage in this deplorable practice.

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At the same time, the report shows that governments are extending their abuses beyond their own borders. Nicaragua, attempting to pressure and punish exiled activists by seizing their assets. Tajikistan, working with other countries to forcibly return human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists who’ve fled abroad.

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The report documents atrocities reminiscent of humanity’s darkest moments. In Sudan, both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have committed war crimes. Rohingya in Burma, Uyghurs in Xinjiang, each victims of genocide and crimes against humanity. The United States will continue to raise our deep concerns directly with the governments responsible.

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This year’s report also captures human rights abuses against members of vulnerable communities. In Afghanistan, the Taliban have limited work opportunities for women, shuttered institutions found educating girls, and increasing floggings for women and men accused of “immoral behavior.” Uganda passed a draconian and discriminatory Anti-Homosexuality Act, threatening LGBTQI+ individuals with life imprisonment, even death, simply for being with the person they loved.

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Across countries and regions, authorities are increasingly using technology to intimidate, to censor, to surveil. Governments are deploying artificial intelligence to spread disinformation, and even tracking people based on their DNA. They’re cutting off and throttling internet access, as Iran did to suppress protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Zhina Amini. The Assad regime and others are abusing commercial spyware to target journalists and activists.

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The United States is also actively working to ensure that emerging technologies are used to bolster rights, not undermine them; to make sure that technology is used to advance equal opportunity, not to discriminate against people.

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Just to cite one example, we’ve mobilized a coalition of like-minded governments to counter the proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware. Today, as part of our government-wide effort, we’re imposing visa restrictions on more than a dozen individuals who contributed to human rights abuses by helping to develop and sell these tools.

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Hamas’s horrific attacks on Israel on October 7th last year, and the devastating loss of civilian life in Gaza as Israel exercises its right to ensure that those attacks never happen again, have also raised deeply troubling human rights concerns.

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We continue to work every day to bring the fighting to an end, to secure the release of hostages held by Hamas and other groups, to uphold international humanitarian law, to prevent further suffering, to create a path toward a more peaceful and secure future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

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These are just a few illustrations from the many countries covered in this report. And the report itself is just one of numerous ways that the United States is working to promote respect for rights and the dignity of all people. We also leveraged bipartisan legislation, like the Global Magnitsky Act, and tools like the Khashoggi Ban to hold to account those who perpetrate or profit from human rights abuses.

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Thanks in part to efforts like these, especially by advocates and citizens who are on the front lines, 2023 also saw some encouraging developments. Despite the proliferation of anti-LGBTI+ laws in some parts of the world, countries from Estonia to Japan to Mauritius made important strides in advancing the rights of LGBTQI+ individuals. Even as labor activists have been targeted, locked up, and killed, unions from South Africa to Mexico to Brazil improved working conditions and advanced workers organizing themselves, key objectives of the global labor directive that President Biden issued last November.

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Jordan took steps to ensure that children with disabilities could attend school and receive the support that they need. These bright spots are an important reminder that progress on human rights is indeed possible, as long as committed individuals in every part of the globe continue to work to uphold fundamental dignity for all people.

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On that note, let me just close by thanking a remarkably dedicated team across this department, here in this building, at our posts around the world, who have spent months painstakingly compiling this report. I also want to recognize everyone who helped document the incidents that make up this important resource, journalists, human rights defenders, citizens, often at great personal risk. Because of each of you, we have a clearer picture of human rights conditions as they are, as well as a renewed determination to strengthen them for the future.

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So with that, let me take a few questions, and then I’ll turn it back over to Bob and to Matt.

Humeyra.

Hello, Mr. Secretary. I have two questions; one is about the report, but let me quickly go to your phone calls last night. You had two important phone calls with Israel’s Benny Gantz and Yoav Gallant, who both strongly objected to upcoming punitive action from US on specific Israeli military unit over human rights allegations. Have those phone calls changed your mind? When will you announce the action?

(08:47)
And then coming back to the report again, in this report you have a sentence saying Israelis operating in Gaza took no publicly visible steps to identify and punish officials accused of committing rights abuses. The accusations about IDF’s military conduct in Gaza have piled up; they include using food as a weapon, targeting civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate bombing, something even the President has said is taking place. So I’m wondering, we know you’ve got ongoing processes about this, but could you tell us why is it taking so long to make a definitive assessment about these? And the fact that it’s taken so long triggers, like leads a lot of people suggesting that US has a double standard when it comes to applying the law with Israel. Does the US have a double standard? Thank you.

Great. Thanks, Humeyra. Let me start with the last part of the question: Do we have a double standard? The answer is no. As this report makes clear, in general, as we’re looking at human rights and the condition of human rights around the world, we apply the same standard to everyone, and that doesn’t change whether the country in question is an adversary, a competitor, a friend, or an ally. And that’s hugely important.

(10:08)
With regard to the Leahy Law report that I think you were referring to at the outset, this is I think a good example of a process that is very deliberate, that seeks to get the facts, to get all the information, that has to be done carefully, and that’s exactly how we proceeded, as we proceed with any country that is the recipient of military assistance from the United States. And again, the same standard applies.

(10:40)
I don’t have more to say about it today, but I think you’ll see in the days ahead that we will have more to say, so please stay tuned on that.

(10:49)
On Gaza itself, a few things. First, from day one, we’ve been working to do everything we can to try to increase protection for civilians as well as to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance for the Gazans who so desperately need it. When it comes to allegations of incidents of, whether it’s violations of international humanitarian law, rights abuses, you name it, we have processes within the department that are looking at incidents that have been raised. Those processes are ongoing. And here, again, it’s important that we take the time to do our best to get the facts, to get the information, to do the analysis. It’s very challenging to do this in real time. And most, as you’ll see if you look back at other places where we’ve made determinations ourselves, it usually takes time to do that to get the information.

Can you at least provide a timeline for any of that?

I’m not going to give you a timeline except to say that these efforts are ongoing. And when we feel that we have the facts, we’ve been able to do the analysis, we’ll make known the findings. Similarly, though, when we see reports of incidents, we also take these directly to, in this case, the Israeli government and ask for an explanation, information about what did or didn’t happen. That too is an ongoing process, and it’s, I think, very important to make sure that countries know that we’re watching this very, very carefully. But as I say on the Leahy piece of this, more to come in the coming days.

Kylie.

Thank you for doing this, Secretary. I have a question on the report as well with regard to what it says about Gaza, and it says that war crimes have been committed by Israel and Hamas. And I wonder if this building is actually looking into those allegations to determine their validity, like you guys looked into allegations of war crimes in Ukraine; and if there isn’t an assessment happening in this building, who the US government is relying on for that assessment to be made.

Yeah, so Kylie, as I said, we are looking into reports, incidents that are brought to our attention, and we have a process to do that, particularly if there are questions about whether US arms have been involved, and that is ongoing. And we are continuing to be focused on that.

(13:41)
Every situation, every country is different. For example, the case of Ukraine, where we have made certain determinations, totally different situation than in Gaza. The Ukrainians, first of all, themselves were not in any way a legitimate target the way, of course, Hamas is in Gaza. They were also not embedding themselves with civilians, hiding in and under apartment buildings, mosques, hospitals, you name it. And in addition, in the case of Ukraine, when Russian forces, for example, withdrew from Bucha, we were able to see, the world was able to see very plainly what had happened, and we were able to get the evidence.

(14:22)
So each of these situations is different, and we have to do our best to collect the facts and follow the facts, and that’s what we’re doing.

So ultimately, just to be clear, this building will make its own determination if war crimes are being committed by Israel or Hamas or any of those other groups?

We make our own determinations, and of course there may be other bodies that do the same, but we make our own determinations. But importantly in the case of Israel, Israel has and has demonstrated the capacity also to look at itself. And again, this is what separates democracies from other countries, the ability, the willingness, the determination to look at themselves. It’s my understanding that they have many open investigations based on reports that have come forward with allegations about abuses of human rights or abuse of international humanitarian law, laws of war, et cetera.

(15:21)
So in the first instance, I think that’s the most important thing, that any of our democracies have to make sure that we’re policing ourselves, holding ourselves to the standards that we’re asking of others. I believe Israel is in the process of doing that based on knowledge of open investigations that they have. And as I said, when incidents are brought to our attention, we look at them, and particularly if there’s a possibility that US arms were used in those incidents.

(15:48)
Thanks.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, does the Geneva Convention apply to Gaza? Reporters have been asking this for months and not gotten an answer.

Good afternoon to you all, and I express my thanks to Secretary Blinken and to Spokesperson Matt Miller for their great remarks and for the introduction. My name is Robert Gilchrist, Ambassador Robert Gilchrist, and I am the Senior Bureau Official in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. I am honored to be here with you all today to release the 48th Annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices, which was submitted to Congress earlier today.

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This congressionally mandated report, colloquially known as the Human Rights Report, has been a flagship effort of the DRL Bureau since 1977. It is completed only through the significant expertise and effort brought by the State Department’s dedicated public servants in US missions abroad and in Washington, for which I and the Department of State are grateful. Human rights belong to everyone, and this report is one

… way we demonstrate our commitment to these universal rights. Even though our human rights are universal, they are far from universally respected, and the United States recognizes that standing up for these rights is often dangerous. Human rights defenders and civil society leaders around the world often work at great personal risk to improve the lives of all. That is especially the case for those whose work includes protecting women and girls, members of racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups, LGBTQI+, and persons with disabilities. Members of these groups and those who press for the protection of human rights are often targeted with threats and harassment, arrest, and violence. The brave individuals across the globe who risk their own life and freedom to champion the human rights and dignity of others deserve our deep thanks.

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In the nearly 50 years since the United States first rolled out the human rights report, we have seen significant changes in respect for human rights around the world. There have been tragedies but also triumphs. There have been times when US leadership on human rights has been heralded and times when it has been questioned.

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But as we look to the future, just a few months after the 75th anniversary of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, one thing is clear, US global leadership in defense and support of human rights is as necessary as ever. This is not a responsibility we take lightly or for granted. We know leadership is earned. The report, unparalleled by any government in its comprehensive approach to human rights worldwide, is one of the tools towards that end. The human rights report does not seek to catalog every human rights abuse or violation throughout the year, nor does it reach legal conclusions. What it does uniquely is present for each country a credible, carefully vetted report that provides the world with a clear window into the human rights conditions in every corner of the globe. This objective reporting is more essential than ever in a world where we increasingly see facts smeared as lies, lies presented as facts, and information manipulated to disturbing ends by autocrats and other malign actors. By shining a light on the human rights conditions of our adversaries and our partners equally, and by lifting up the selfless efforts of human rights defenders and civil society groups working to improve respect for those rights, the United States is helping contribute to a world where those rights are better protected for everyone.

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Although the report documents human rights conditions in countries around the world, the Biden-Harris administration has made clear that human rights must be safeguarded at home as well. The administration has emphasized since taking office in 2021 the US credibility and standing on human rights internationally depend on how well we are living up to our own obligations and commitments to advance human rights domestically. So we speak of the need to protect and respect human rights for everyone. And when we say that, we mean everyone.

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At the conclusion of this briefing, the State Department’s website will have the 2023 human rights report available for the public. I very much appreciate your attendance today, and I’m happy also to take a few questions.

Guita?

Thank you.

(20:18)
Hello. Guita Aryan from Voice of America. I have a question on Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has cracked down on women’s compulsory hijab since late March and on. And as of the day it attacked Israel, it has even intensified that crackdown.

(20:44)
At the same time, there’s legislation on Capitol Hill mandating that the administration sanction higher leadership officials, the supreme leader, the president. Now, with this report, which this report is about last year, 2023, and this year, I’m sure there’s a lot more you may have, isn’t it not time to sanction the higher officials? And should the legislation pass and become an act, it requires the first report within 90 days. Would you be able to fulfill that?

I guess there are a few things in my response. First of all, with regard to any legislation of course, the department remains committed to fully implementing every law that is passed by Congress. And so there’s certainly a commitment by the department to fulfilling the law.

(21:46)
As you pointed out, this report refers to 2023. However, in 2023, Iran’s dismal human rights record continued to deteriorate. They resume increasingly targeted members of religious and ethnic minority groups, human rights lawyers, journalists, and civil society activists.

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And as you pointed out, the situation with regard to women continued to deteriorate as well. Iranian women faced increased discrimination through expanded application of punishments against people who violate the mandatory dress code, as you pointed out, leading to protests and widespread acts of civil disobedience. And many women and human rights activists received additional prison sentences for their activism, and they remain behind bars.

(22:29)
The authorities continued to detain, sentence, and execute people in an effort to suppress the peaceful protests that began after the Mahsa Jina Amini’s September ’22 death while in custody of the morality police. So the United States also continues to work in multinational arena.

(22:47)
With regard to sanctions, we have applied sanctions. With regard to any future sanctions, I’m not going to speculate about what may happen in the future, but the department has already actively used visa restrictions and economic sanctions to promote accountability for Iranian authority’s human rights violations since the most recent crackdown following the 2022 riots.

Said?

Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Thank you, sir. The last three reports have shown steadily declining human rights conditions for the Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem on all aspects.

(23:26)
I want to ask you about one aspect, which is administrative detention. The Israelis have put in practice since 1967 something called administrative detention where they arrest people without charges. They keep them in prison for months, years, sometimes decades, without ever charging them, including children. I want to ask you, is that a violation of international human rights in your view?

Well, I’ll refer you to the human rights report in terms of what we say on that specific issue.

(23:57)
With regard to Israel, again, we have been clear with Israel on the moral obligations and strategic imperative it has to protect civilians and human rights of civilians. And in addition, we’ve been firm in stating that Israel must abide by international humanitarian law, investigate allegations of wrongdoing, including wrongful detentions, and ensure accountability. And that remains US commitment.

So is it in the view of the United States that administrative detention, as practiced by Israel, a violation of international human rights?

As I said with regard to the human rights reports, the human rights reports do not trigger any sanctions, do not provide any analysis, but rather provide an assessment of the facts on the ground as they’re reported to our embassy.

Thank you.

Missy Ryan.

Hi. Missy Ryan from The Washington Post. I wanted to ask you a little bit more about the assessment regarding Israel’s response to alleged human rights abuses by members of the government or the security forces. In the 2022 report, it says that the Israeli military civilian justice systems have rarely found members of the security forces to have committed abuses, and then says that some steps were taken. In the ’23 report, it just says that some credible steps were taken to identify and punish.

(25:19)
Is the US assessment no longer that Israel rarely takes action against the security forces? Could you somehow provide-

I think regarding that specific language, I don’t have details with regard to that, but we can certainly get back to you with that.

Could you give us some sort of assessment of, some steps were taken, to what extent were the steps taken? Was it occasionally? How far did it go to what you feel like would be an adequate standard if you could provide any context there.

I think in the framework of the reports, we don’t provide sort of a qualitative assessment of a particular situation or how things have evolved regarding that language. I can see if we have additional details, I can provide you with it. I can say that as I just said, that we raise these issues with the Israeli government continuously, and including at the highest levels, with the firm belief that Israel has a moral obligation and imperative to protect civilians and the rights of individuals in Israel and the occupied territories. But I don’t have any further specifics with regard to that language.

Jenny?

Thank you, sir. On China, regarding the Chinese government labor exploitation of North Korean defectors and their repatriation to North Korea, have you discussed this matter with the China? And what measures is the United States currently taking on this?

Well, as has been announced, the secretary will soon be traveling to the PRC this week. And he will, as he does in all of his engagements with the PRC, raise human rights at the highest levels and in the clearest way, and that means with regard to the full array of concerns that we have with the PRC. I won’t go into details with regard to specific conversations, but of course this is an issue that remains of concern, and is one that we raise with our Chinese counterparts.

Thank you.

[inaudible 00:27:25]?

Just one thing on the numbers that you’ve used. In this report, you have more than 21,000 Palestinians. That’s obviously, I understand you had a cutoff at the end of the year, 2023. What is the source for that number?

Our embassy and the US government used diverse sources. With regard to that specific source, that’s something we can get back to you. But we rely on a range of sources for the information that we’re able to pull together for the human rights reports.

Within those range of sources, do you use Gaza’s Health Ministry?

With regard to that specific number, I would say that we use a broad range of sources, including from local authorities, as well as from international organizations and NGOs.

So it does include Gaza’s Health Ministry?

I’m not saying that specifically. I’m providing you a broader answer.

[inaudible 00:28:19].

I’m providing a broader assessment in terms of where the numbers come from for our human rights reports.

Thank you, Matt. From Bangladesh, thank you for doing this. Given the significant human rights abuse highlighted in your reports, including arbitrary killings, torture, and political imprisonment, particularly with reference to the case of former prime minister and leader of the opposition, as you mentioned, that is a political ploy to remove her from the political process.

(28:48)
So how do you ensure these reports lead to tangible changes, and that the regime responsible face consequences for their extreme human rights violations? One more on India.

I think ensuring anything will happen can be challenging. Certainly our hope with the human rights report is by shining the light on specific issues and specific human rights concerns, we’re able to help facilitate change by governments and regimes in a positive direction.

(29:21)
With regard to Bangladesh, we had the visa restriction policy, that was announced in May 2023, implemented before the elections, with the hope of reducing violence to deter actions that could undermine the democratic election process. We have nothing new to announce at this time. But as our longstanding practice, we don’t often preview actions with regard to policy or with regard to visas.

(29:47)
But we have repeatedly expressed concern about the efforts by the government to repress freedom of expression, including for members of the press, freedom of association, and other fundamental freedoms in human rights. And that remains a continued concern of the United States.

So one more on India. Your reports are finding significant human rights issues, including credible reports of arbitrary and local killings, including extrajudicial killings and the attack of the press. And you mentioned that the government took minimal credible steps or action to identify and punish officials who have committed human rights abuses. I’m quoting from your report.

(30:33)
So what action you are taking to make the government accountable, as India is your are very strategic partner of the United States?

What I will say is the US and India regularly consult at the highest levels on democracy and human rights issues. We strongly encourage, urge India to uphold its human rights, obligations and commitments.

(30:53)
We also regularly meet with civil society representatives, both in the US and India, to hear their perspectives, and those sorts of perspectives inform the human rights report. And we encourage the government of India to consult and meet regularly with civil society organizations representing a diversity of people.

(31:11)
So there are a number of steps. It remains a key component of not just our dialogue, but in terms of our engagement with India.

Nadia?

I just have a technical question, actually. When you said you have multiple sources of gathering information, do you rely on Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations, especially B’Tselem? And does the embassy in Jerusalem have some kind of a final say on it? Do they omit information? Do they block certain information? Or is the State Department basically the one who makes the final decision?

I would say, well, our embassy in Jerusalem is part of the State Department, so certainly the reports are pulled together in the field with information that’s compiled from our embassy, but also in Washington.

(31:59)
And in the end, what this represents is the voice of the entire State Department. And we pull from a multitude of sources, including from within government and outside of government.

Alex?

Thanks so much. [inaudible 00:32:15], because I have two questions. One’s on Georgia. The report reflects last year Georgia government’s failed attempt to push foreign agent law. Can you just put in the context, given the current events going in the country, why was it wrong back then in your opinion, and why is it wrong right now? And second on Azerbaijan. The secretary last year spoke with President Aliyev and he raised human rights concerns in the country multiple times. But yet we see the report reflects 254 political prisoners in the country. Is it a reflection of the fact that you guys don’t have enough tool to move the needle?

Well, with regard to the foreign agent’s law in Georgia, the US remains deeply concerned that if enacted, this draft legislation would harm civil society and civil society organizations that are working to improve the lives of Georgian citizens, and we derailed Georgia from its European path. We are equally concerned this draft legislation would impede independent media organizations working to provide access for Georgian citizens to high-quality information.

(33:14)
With regard to Azerbaijan, we have significant concerns, as pointed out in the human rights report, regarding credible reports of significant human rights abuses, including torture and other physical abuses, political prisoners, and a lack of independent judiciary. Further law enforcement officials arrested an unprecedented number of people for having alleged links to Iran.

(33:39)
The United States promotes respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms when meeting with Azerbaijani officials at all levels, and through US government statements, statements in international organizations, and meetings with human rights advocates. For example, we continue to call publicly for the expeditious release of all unjustly detained political prisoners and detainees, including independent

… independent journalists, civil society activists, and government critics. We also employ social media – for example, the department’s Without Just Cause campaign to release unjustly detained political prisoners, including an Azerbaijani individual, until he was released during the year. So this remains, of course, something that we’re engaged on.

Okay. We’ll take one more in the back.

Me?

Yeah, go ahead.

Okay. Thank you very much for this opportunity.

(34:26)
How do you describe human rights situation in Iran, especially in Kurdistan and Baluchistan regions, after Jina Amini’s revelations?

Okay, let’s see. Well, thank you for your question. Well, I’ll say it bluntly: Iran’s dismal human rights record further deteriorated in 2023, as the regime increasingly targeted members of religious and ethnic minority groups, human rights lawyers, journalists, and civil society activists with intimidation, arrests, lengthy prison sentences, and used sexual violence and torture against prisoners and detainees. The Iranian regime, as I said earlier, expanded its discriminatory measures against women and increased its use of the death penalty, which was often applied after sham trials against defendants who lacked legal counsel. And this was disproportionately applied against members of the Baluchi and Kurdish ethnic minorities.

(35:29)
The Iranian regime continued to project its repression abroad, intimidating, harassing, and silencing perceived dissidents beyond its border. The State Department used visa restrictions and economic sanctions to promote accountability for Iranian authorities’ human rights violations since the most recent crackdown following the 2022 protests. We have taken action to restrict visas or impose sanctions on over 100 Iranian entities and individuals connected to human rights abuses, including the violent suppression of peaceful assembly.

(36:02)
We provided support to help Iranians connect internet with anti-censorship tools, with 30 million Iranians used at the height… which they used this internet that we were able to help with, at the height of the 2022 protests. We issued General License D-2, allowing U.S. companies to offer new internet services to Iranians. In the multilateral arena, the U.S. continued to support the fact-finding mission at the UN Human Rights Council that we helped stand up in November 2022. We were also instrumental in working with allies and partners to kick Iran off the UN Commission on the Status of Women.

(36:39)
And regarding transnational repression, we worked across the U.S. Government to share information and coordinate action, collaborated with like-minded governments and international organizations, conducted outreach to affected individuals and communities, and raised TNR in international fora. So I would say we’ve been quite engaged.

Thank you, Ambassador.

Okay. Thank you.

Okay. So let’s see if anyone has anything left for me. Olivia.

I have some.

Go ahead. Hi.

As one point of clarification on Humeyra’s question, has the Israeli Government been officially apprised of the Secretary’s determinations on the Leahy Law?

I am not going to speak to private diplomatic communications between our two governments.

Well, has official notification been offered to the Israeli Government?

I think to answer that question I’d have to violate the answer I just gave you, which is I’m not going to speak to the private diplomatic conversations between our two countries. As the Secretary made quite clear when he was up here, we’ll have more to say about this matter soon, and unfortunately you’ll just have to wait until that time.

Would it be in conversation that such notification is given, or is there like a-

I’m just not going to get into the exact details.

All right. In the region… Can I stay, or just-

Yeah. Yeah, go ahead.

On Iran, do you have reason to believe that we’ve seen the last of the direct kinetic exchanges between Iran and Israel? And by that I mean has this department had messages with both indicating that it stops here?

I’m going to give you what you are probably going to find an unsatisfying answer, which is sometimes in diplomacy the less said the better, and I’m not going to comment about the reports from Friday, as we try to be consistent about in the United States Government. But, that said, one of our top priorities since the outset of this conflict is to prevent it from widening, prevent it from escalating, and prevent it from spreading any further. And so that’s been our focus since October 7th. It’s something that we’ve worked hard on, including the last few weeks, and we will continue to focus on trying to convince everyone in the region that escalation is not in their interest.

On that point, do you take the recent strikes on U.S. forces in the region as an indication that Tehran is again encouraging or at least no longer preventing its proxies from taking action against U.S. interests?

So we certainly condemn the attack by an Iran-aligned militia group against U.S. forces in Syria. I will say we find it especially troubling that this militia group chose to resume its attacks against U.S. personnel just hours after Prime Minister Sudani of Iraq had completed a successful visit to Washington, so it seems clear that Iran has no respect for Iraqi sovereignty. We’ve seen these attacks, obviously, in the past. We have made quite clear to Iran, we’ve made quite clear to Iran’s proxy groups that we will defend our interests, we will defend our personnel, and that continues to be the case.

So you are linking it directly to Iran?

These are proxy groups that are sponsored by Iran, absolutely.

Sure.

Absolutely.

Okay. Okay. Just to clarify.

Yeah.

And then, sorry, one last one. Late last week, the CIA director acknowledged he’s been taking part in hostage talks and characterized them rather bleakly, saying it was like a big rock to push up a very steep hill right now. He signaled pessimism that the talks would restart, let alone result in a deal. Does that characterization track with the view from this building of the talks?

It does, and the reason why I think you heard the director of the CIA make those comments, the reason the Secretary made the comments he did on Friday when he spoke to this at the meeting of the G7 foreign ministers, is what you have seen over the past few weeks is Hamas move the goalposts. There are demands that they have made. Israel has moved some way to meeting those demands, and Hamas has then changed their demands. And so it certainly does seem like Hamas is more interested in a full-scale regional war, that they were watching the events of the past few weeks and making the determination that they might get the full-scale regional war they were hoping for, and so have not agreed to a very significant proposal that was on the table.

(41:05)
And so we will continue to push for an agreement because we believe it’s in the interests of Israel, we believe it’s in the interests of the United States, we believe it’s in the interests of the broader region. But it takes two to make an agreement, and right now Hamas has signaled that they don’t want an agreement. And the ball is very much in their court, and if they really had the interests of the Palestinian people at heart, as they claim that they do, then they would accept this agreement, because this agreement would get an immediate ceasefire. It would allow more humanitarian assistance to flow in. It would dramatically alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people. So we want to see that deal move forward and we’re going to continue to push for it.

And, sorry, that’s the state of play? Hamas either accepts this deal or nothing?

I’m not going to get into the negotiation process, we have never done that, other than to say that, as you heard the Secretary say Friday, Israel moved significantly in agreeing to the last offer that was put onto the table, and Hamas in response has moved the goalposts. We think they ought to accept the deal.

Thank you.

Said, go ahead.

Thank you, Matt. On Saturday, Palestinian civil defense crews have uncovered a mass grave with 180 people, including women, men, and children, that Israel had basically killed those people. That’s what they’re saying. Are you aware of the report and do you have any comment on it?

I’ve seen those reports and we are inquiring about it with the Government of Israel.

Will the U.S. press the Israelis to find out more about this issue?

That’s exactly what we are doing.

Okay. One more question on UNRWA. The final report shows that Israel has failed in submitting any evidence on the participation of UNRWA staff in the attack on October 7th, and it seems that the secretary-general has accepted the finding by Ms. Catherine Colonna around the report. Will that be acceptable to you, that the secretary-general has accepted that? And would you have any further comment on this?

So a few things. Number one, we have just received the report and are reviewing itself, and so I don’t want to make any assessments until we’ve been able to complete that review of the report which we just received this morning. Certainly, we welcome the fact that the secretary-general has accepted the recommendations. We have long made clear that there needs to be reforms at UNRWA, and we would welcome the UN making the reforms that former Foreign Minister Colonna made in her report.

(43:47)
I would also say that we understand there is another investigation the UN is still conducting, so one has been completed, there’s another one that’s ongoing. But certainly, we have always made clear that we think the role that UNRWA plays is indispensable in providing and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance not just in Gaza but in the broader region. We continue to support the work that they do.

Okay. Was the U.S. a bit too precipitous in cutting off funds to UNRWA before all the facts were found?

So Said, I think people forget sometimes the timeline and the facts on which we made that decision to suspend funding and confuse what it is we actually did. So the U.S. did not make that determination based on the Government of Israel presenting us evidence. We made that determination when UNRWA came to us and said they were aware of these allegations, they had investigated them, they had found them to be credible. And, again, this is with respect to the 12 UNRWA employees who are alleged to have participated in the October 7th attacks, not any of the broader allegations that have been leveled at UNRWA. UNRWA itself had done an initial investigation, had found those allegations to be credible enough that they had fired all or most of those employees.

(44:58)
So, no, I think we acted appropriately given the facts that were presented to us by UNRWA, not by Israel but by UNRWA. And so we welcome the conclusion of this first investigation. We’ll look to see what the other one produces.

(45:11)
Nadia, go ahead.

Thank you.

I’ll come… Go ahead.

I just want to follow up what the Secretary said. He said that the State Department does not practice double standard when it comes to Ukraine and Gaza in terms of human rights violation. I mean, I want to put aside whether it is targeting civilians, whether it’s mass graves have been discovered, whatever. I just want to ask you specifically on the statement that the Secretary made, and he said Russia is committing war crimes when it cuts off water, electricity, and fuel on a civilian population. Israel did exactly the same. How can you say that Russia is committing a war crime and Israelis are not?

So-

What’s the technical differences?

So I would say that we have engaged with the Government of Israel to get more humanitarian assistance, and we have seen them take steps to allow more humanitarian assistance in. That is fundamentally the difference. And we have seen over the past few days Israel repairing water pipes to ensure that water can get in. And of course they were letting water flow in through Rafah and through Kerem Shalom along with food and other medicine and other humanitarian assistance.

(46:14)
Now, that said, it has also been our assessment that that has not been sufficient and that they needed to allow more in, which is why you’ve seen us engage at the highest levels of the government, including President Biden himself, making quite clear to Prime Minister Netanyahu that they needed to do more and that our policy would be that the policy determinations we make will depend on the decisions that Israel makes.

(46:37)
So there is a difference in the situation in how Russia has behaved and how Israel has behaved, and we have engaged with Israel to see them allow more humanitarian assistance in. It’s not something you can say about Russia, which has continued to intentionally target civilians. As the Secretary made clear, one of the big differences in this conflict is that you have in Gaza a terrorist organization that’s embedding itself inside a civilian population. Ukrainian military doesn’t do that. It’s not… And so that makes the entire nature of the conflict different. But it doesn’t change the standard that we expect Israel to hold itself to.

Right. But legally you cannot target civilians even if you have a terrorist organization embedded in hospitals and schools.

Of course not.

Legally speaking-

That’s what I mean-

… that’s, yeah, a war crime.

That’s what I mean about it doesn’t change the standard that Israel should be held to. Absolutely.

Right. And just one last thing also about what he said. He said there is a difference between dictatorship and democracy in terms of investigation, Israel does its own investigation. I’m just wondering, because Israel is not just… the democracy in Israel is not analogous to Western Europe or to United States, because it’s still an occupying force, and that’s the fundamental difference between Israel and the rest of the democracies, because it has an army that’s occupying people by force in the West Bank and Gaza as well even if they withdraw the troops.

(48:01)
So my question to you is, how do you judge them if most of this investigation, basically the results have no accountability for most of the soldiers, because even if it’s a democracy, Israel does not have a track record of investigating itself and give us a credible record that we can go by and we say, “Yes, they are right because they are capable of doing that”?

So a few things. First, just broadly speaking, Israel is a democracy and Israel does have checks and balances inside its system that are very different than when you look at Russia. Israel does have a track record of conducting investigations into its military and at times imposing accountability measures. We have seen them do that. They have made those accountability measures in public in the past. It doesn’t mean that those are always at the level that we would want from the United States Government.

(48:54)
It doesn’t mean it’s always at the level that other interested parties would want. But they do have a track record, including in this conflict, of opening investigations. They don’t always publicize them, but they have made us aware of investigations that they are conducting. And we will look to see that those investigations are fair, and that if accountability is merited, that accountability is what is imposed. And so they have a long track record going back of investigating soldiers and others who take actions that are inconsistent with humanitarian law or inconsistent with the Israeli military code of conduct.

(49:28)
But that said, we also make our own assessments. And we will make our own assessments based on the facts, based on the law, and we will call it like we see it.

(49:39)
But I do think it is a bit of a false equivalency. It’s not to say… And by that, I’m not trying to criticize you, it’s not to say that Israel should be immune from criticism. They absolutely shouldn’t. But it is a very different system than Russia and other countries that have no-

I was comparing to democracies.

Yeah, yeah, I know. That’s what I’m saying. I’m not quibbling with your question at all. With other countries that have no means of mechanism, or that don’t have a free press that demands accountability, or don’t have freedom of speech and open debate. You see protests in Israel, you see the free press digging into things that they’re doing. And you of course see their own internal accountability mechanisms. But as I said, we will continue to monitor and make our own assessments.

(50:19)
Humeyra.

Just a couple of small follow-ups here and there. When you were answering about UNRWA, you said United States has taken into account what UNRWA told United States. But have you seen any evidence, either from UN itself or Israel, with regards to those allegations?

So I’m not going to speak to the… First of all, with respect to the UN report that came out today, we’ve seen the report, people are reviewing it. With respect to the broader allegations about the 12, I don’t know if the Israeli Government has provided them to us. We didn’t necessarily need it when you have UNRWA coming

… coming and presenting the findings. UNRWA, obviously, when they come and say they have investigated themself and found them to be credible, it’s not necessarily in their interest to do that. When you have an organization that’s come and told us that on the front end, I don’t know that we need corroborating evidence from the government of Israel. UNRWA itself has said that they found it, but that said, it may be that we’ve interacted with them on that I’m just not aware of.

Okay. But I mean, just super be clear, there are two separate investigations right now. One focusing on the 12 people whose result hasn’t come out yet. And there is the-

That’s my understanding the United Nations should speak to that, but that’s my understanding of [inaudible 00:51:36].

Yes, and then there’s the Colonna Report, whose result has come out. Have you seen any evidence from UN, UNRWA, Israel, anyone regarding these allegations on both of those with evidence?

So with respect to the Colonna Report, I’m not going to speak to that until we’ve had a chance to review it. Presumably the report will contain evidentiary questions in it, but as I said I haven’t read it yet myself. I know people are here are reviewing it. With respect to the other matter, the 12 individuals. UNRWA presented evidence to us when they came and briefed us on the first set of allegations. They told us what they had found in the course of their initial investigation. So that very much is information that we found to be credible based on UNRWA’s own assessment of it.

And going back to this upcoming punitive action under Leahy Law, it is out there being reported as a sanction, which is usually used for action by US Treasury, OFAC. It is, our understanding is that’s not entirely the case. Can you clarify? Can you make the distinction?

So I’ll just say not with respect to our determinations as they relate to Israel, but broadly speaking, the Leahy Law does not contain sanctions authority. That’s not how the law works. What the law does is require the United States to make assessments whenever we are providing security assistance to a foreign military. To make assessments about whether those militaries have committed violations of human rights. If we find, once we found when a country has committed a violation of human rights, the next question goes to has there been proper accountability?

(53:20)
If there has been proper accountability, then U.S. funded assistance can continue because that government has done the right thing in response to a human rights violation. If there has not been proper accountability, then we suspend our assistance. But it’s a suspension of assistance that can be remediated. There are certain steps that a government can go through to remediate that suspension of assistance.

(53:42)
But no, it is not a sanction in the classic sense that treasuries impose the sanctions or even that the State Department in some areas imposes sanctions.

Right. So as a result of that action, that particular military unit would not be able to receive any US assistance, would not be able to join any US training, the punitive action of would be along those lines?

Correct.

Yes,

Correct.

Are you guys looking into any allegations regarding the same unit in their conduct post-October 7th?

I’m not going to speak to those assessments. We’ve always made clear that we have a number of different ongoing assessments based on incidents that have been submitted to us so that we have seen ourselves and those processes are ongoing. But I’m not going to speak to which units or which processes, how we’re looking at that, those various assessments.

Can I just follow up on that for one second and then I want to transition to China unless others, but with regard to the US military assistance to specific units potentially being prohibited, Is there a way for the US to actually track if that military assistance that we’re giving to Israel is prevented from going to a unit or is the onus really on the partner government, in this case Israel, to make sure that that happens?

So every government to whom we provide security assistance, we sign agreements related to that provision of assistance. And one of the things that our partner countries agree to is that if we do find a Leahy Law violation, that they will not transfer US weapons, US security assistance to those units and we do assess that on an ongoing basis. But it is our partner countries that have committed to abide by the law, US law, and our assessment of US law. And we expect all of our partner countries to comply with that.

Okay. Can I turn-

New China? Yeah.

China. Okay. With the secretary going to China later this week. Obviously we know that the Middle East will be something that’s discussed. I wonder if you could just give us a sort of analysis status update in terms of what this building thinks on how effective China has been in trying to drum down tensions, pushing Iran to de-escalate things in the region. Do you think they have done that effectively? You want to see them do more? Can you just bring us up to speed on that?

So this has been something that has been the focus of the State Department since the immediate days after October 7th. It was I think five or six days after October 7th that the secretary, while we were in the region, called the Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi and made clear to him that we believe it is in China’s interest to prevent the conflict from escalating and prevent the conflict from spreading. And you’ve seen him have subsequent conversations with China about that.

(56:47)
When the Houthis began launching attacks on ships, the secretary had a conversation with Wang Yi about this week before last when it was clear that there was the potential for escalation the region.

(56:58)
So I will let China speak to any actions that it has taken. I don’t think it’s appropriate for us to do so. But we will continue to press the case to China that it’s not just in the interest of the region, it’s not just in the interest of the United States. It’s not just in the interests of the individual countries that are involved, but is the interest of China and the broader world, that there not be a further widening of the conflict. And because of that it is in China’s interest to use the relationships and whatever influence it has with any country in the region to press that message.

And then one more question about the China trip.

(57:37)
A senior administration of official said on Friday that another thing that the secretary would be discussing would be China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base. That’s also something that came up. It was happening at a smaller scale, but it also came up last year when the secretary was there in July. And I just wonder what makes this building think that China would be more apt to listen now if all they’ve done is expand how much support they have given to Russia’s defense industrial base in the last nine months or so?

So a few things with respect to that. Number one, it is not just the United States that has this concern. And if you’ve seen the conversations the Secretary’s had over the past several weeks, he first, he traveled to Brussels and met with NATO foreign ministers where he talked about what we have seen industry in China doing with rebuilding the Russia’s defense industrial base and allowing themselves to rearm and reequip on the battlefield and use that expanded industrial base to kill Ukrainians.

(58:52)
And then last week at a meeting with G-7 foreign ministers where he made the same points and briefed them quite extensively on what we have found. More extensively than we have made public about what we have seen and what we have found and what we have seen Chinese companies doing.

(59:07)
And what he heard in both of those meetings is that the concern is not just the United States, that the concern is shared by our allies and partners and that there is a consensus belief that China cannot, on one hand say it’s committed to European security, and on the other hand continue to fuel the greatest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.

(59:31)
That is the first point. That is not just the United States making this point to China, that I believe allies and partners of the United States will be making this point as well to China. And some probably already have made this point to China.

(59:44)
And then the second thing is that we will be there to have very direct, very clear conversations with them about these concerns and lay them out in detail. And I’ll say in the previous trip, it was a different situation where we had not seen China transferring direct arms to Russia, which is something you may recall from the outset of this conflict. We were very worried about and we saw China say that they wouldn’t do it, and we have not assessed that they have transferred direct arms.

(01:00:12)
But at the same time, we made clear to them that we would be watching what Chinese private companies did and we wanted China to take action to stop the transfer of goods that could be used for Russia’s industrial base and that we were prepared to take our own action.

(01:00:28)
We have taken our own action, we’ve imposed more than a hundred sanctions and export controls targeting Chinese companies that have provided such equipment to Russia. And we of course won’t hesitate to do more if appropriate. So we will go in and deliver these messages, not just about what we did last year, but how the changing environment we’ve seen and the views of our allies and partners as well. And with that, I’ll apologize. I recognize that was an extremely long-winded answer.

Thank you. I wanted to follow up specifically on that point because I mean it also comes on the heels of President Biden raising this directly with President Xi in a phone call, right? So I mean, has any of that diplomatic pressure already shown signs that it will move the needle? And if not, are there measures that the US is willing to consider in order to moderate China’s behavior on this front specifically?

We do think that there is more that China can do and we have always made clear that we are willing and able to take our own actions if appropriate. And I think I’ll leave it at that for now.

(01:01:25)
Channy, go ahead and then we’re going to wrap in a few, sorry not to get to everybody’s, but we’ve been out for an hour now.

On two occasions North Korea see a large number of cruise and ballistic missiles last weekend. And North Korea declared that all missiles can be equipped with nuclear weapons. As you know, China and Russia continue to ignore North Korea’s missile provocations. How will the US resolve on this?

Sorry, go ahead.

Yeah.

So first of all, we do condemn the DPRK’s recent ballistic missile launch. This launch, like all of its other ballistic missile launches in recent years, is in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. They pose a threat to regional and international peace and security. And this obviously will be something that will be on the agenda when the secretary travels to Beijing.

One more quick, on defense cost to sharing between the United States and South Korea, is there any possibility of halting the negotiations on this?

I don’t have any update on that. Go ahead.

I have to push on China. First of all, will Secretary Blinken follow up the conversation between President Biden and President Xi on TikTok and how will he proceed this topic since Chinese government already said they’ll oppose any diversity?

I don’t want to get into the topics that will be brought up in these conversations other than to say broadly we are going to talk about progress on areas where the two presidents, President Biden, President Xi agreed to work together at their summit last year on artificial intelligence on people-to-people exchanges on counter-narcotics trafficking.

(01:03:12)
We will be raising areas where we have concern. We’ll be talking about a number of international issues, I spoke already to the Middle East and of course to the war in Russia. And we will be, the secretary will be looking as he did in his last trip last June, to make clear that it is important that the United States and China manage differences between the two countries to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict. But I don’t want to preview a specific conversation.

This week the Senate will vote for two bills related to China. One is the aid to Taiwan, the second one is on TikTok. Do you feel this bills may give Secretary Blinken more leverage when he goes to China to start his negotiation?

No, I don’t see them as connected. All right, go ahead, and then last question

Regarding the evacuation of displaced Palestinians from Rafah. Before the starting of IGF military operation, will they be transferred to a buffer zone between the Egyptians and Palestinian borders and what the rule of the Palestinian authority will play in this issue?

So I’ll just speak on behalf of the United States and say that we don’t want to see Palestinians evacuated from Rafah unless it is to return to their homes. And we have made that quite clear to the government of Israel that we don’t think there’s any effective way to evacuate 1.4 million Palestinians. There’s no way to conduct an operation in Rafah that would not lead to inordinate civilian harm and would severely hamper the delivery of humanitarian assistance. And that’s the point that we continue to make to them.

There is no plan to transfer them?

I’ll let the government of Israel to speak to their plans and interests. But that is the point that the United States has made clear.

That, excuse me, under the bombing, they will force to leave for that. There is guarantee if they left, they will return, go back home?

I’m sorry, I don’t understand?

Under, if starting the operation, military operation under this threat, they will force to transfer?

Yeah, I understand. So I don’t believe a Rafah operation has begun. That said, Israel has been carrying out airstrikes in Rafah as it has throughout the Gaza Strip since in the days just after October 7th. But it has not launched the full-scale ground offensive that we have heard them say that they’re going to launch and that we have made clear that we think would be a mistake.

(01:05:44)
That said two things with respect to that. Not really respect to this. Well one with respect to potential operation, which is, as I just said, we don’t think that there is a way to effectively evacuate all of the people who have sought refuge there. Sometimes the people who have been displaced more than once. But separate and apart from that, we do want to see people able to leave Rafah to go home to their homes if their homes still exist and to their neighborhoods and to begin rebuilding their homes. That’s a question entirely separate from a military operation. We want to see that happen because we want to see the Palestinian people in Gaza be able to restart their lives and rebuild their lives and ultimately bring this conflict to a close.

(01:06:24)
With that will wrap for today. Thanks everyone. Sorry we’ve been going for more than an hour, so I’ll wrap.